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Abstract
Quantum information theory is a modern branch of theoretical physics. One
of its main goals is to interpret concepts of quantum physics. This leads to
a deeper understanding of quantum theory. The most common examples of
practical applications of basic quantum theory are quantum computation and
quantum cryptography. Quantum cryptography provides secure communica-
tion between legitimate users even in the presence of an adversary by making
possible the distribution of a secret key. It then allows error correction and
privacy amplification, which is elimination of adversary information, through
classical communication.
In this thesis two important aspects of quantum key distribution are
covered, namely robustness bounds with respect to provable entanglement
for ideal protocols and practical quantum key distribution using two-way
classical communication.
In part one of the thesis, ideal quantum key distribution protocols and
their robustness in terms of provable entanglement are discussed. The robust-
ness bounds are proved for most general coherent attacks. These bounds for
provable entanglement are already known to be 25% for the four-state proto-
col and 33% for the six-state protocol. We anticipate to provide a region in
which the legitimate users share entanglement. This region is large for the
four-state protocol and is reduced to a smaller region for the six-state proto-
col because of additional constraint on it. We also investigate the information
cost which the adversary has to pay in order to reach these bounds.
In part two we adopt a more practical approach. We investigate the limi-
tation on distance of secure communication because of practical restrictions.
In particular we investigate the restrictions due to the lack of single photon
sources, the lossy channel and faulty detectors. These practical limitations
have already been observed using one-way classical communication between
legitimate users. It has been observed that it is actually the dark count rate
that limit the distance up to which legitimate users can share a secret key.
We have used two-way classical communication to postpone the effect of dark
counts and increase the distance to considerable amount. For the purpose
we have considered an optimal attack with respect to the disturbance that
an eavesdropper creates while attacking. Any other format of attacking will
increase the disturbance. We show that using two-way classical communica-
tion for post processing we can increase the distance of secure communication
considerably.
Zusammenfassung
Die Quanteninformationstheorie ist ein moderner Zweig der theoretischen
Physik. Eines ihrer Hauptziele ist es, die Konzepte der Quantenphysik zu
interpretieren. Dies fu¨hrt zu einem tieferen Versta¨ndnis der Quantentheorie.
Die bekanntesten Beispiele von praktischen Anwendungen der Quantentheo-
rie sind Quantenrechnen und Quantenkryptographie. Die Quantenkryptogra-
phie erlaubt sichere Kommunikation zwischen berechtigten Nutzern auch
in Gegenwart eines Angreifers durch Ermo¨glichung des Austausches eines
sicheren Schlu¨ssels. Sie ermo¨glicht ferner die Fehlerkorrektur und die pri-
vacy amplification, also die Reduktion der Information des Angreifers, durch
klassische Kommunikation.
In dieser Arbeit werden zwei wichtige Aspekte des Quanten-Schlu¨ssel-
austausches behandelt, na¨mlich Robustheitsschranken in Bezug auf beweis-
bare Verschra¨nkung fu¨r ideale Protokolle und praktischer Quanten-Schlu¨ssel-
austausch unter Verwendung klassischer Zweiweg-Kommunikation.
Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit werden ideale Protokolle fu¨r den Quanten-
Schlu¨sselaustausch und ihre Robustheit in Bezug auf beweisbare Verschra¨n-
kung besprochen. Die Robustheitsschranken werden fu¨r die allgemeinst-
mo¨glichen koha¨renten Angriffe bewiesen. Diese Schranken fu¨r beweisbare
Sicherheit sind 25% fu¨r das Vier-Zustands-Protokoll und 33% fu¨r das Sechs-
Zustands-Protokoll. Wir ermitteln einen Bereich, in dem die berechtigten
Nutzer verschra¨nkte Zusta¨nde teilen. Dieser Bereich reduziert sich wegen
zusa¨tzlicher Einschra¨nkungen auf eine Linie fu¨r das Sechs-Zustands-Protokoll.
Wir untersuchen die Informationsmenge, die der Angreifer aufgeben muß, um
diese Schranken zu erreichen.
Im zweiten Teil wa¨hlen wir einen sta¨rker praxisorientierten Zugang. Wir
untersuchen die Distanz-Beschra¨nkungen der sicheren Kommunikation unter
praktischen Einschra¨nkungen. Insbesondere untersuchen wir die Einschra¨nk-
ungen, die sich durch das Fehlen von Einzelphoton-Quellen, durch verlust-
behaftete Kana¨le und durch fehlerhafte Detektoren ergeben. Diese prak-
tischen Beschra¨nkungen wurden bereits fu¨r Protokolle untersucht, die klas-
sische Einweg-Kommunikation zwischen den berechtigten Nutzern verwen-
den. Es wurde festgestellt, dass es vor allem die Dunkelza¨hlrate ist, die die
Distanz beschra¨nkt, bis zu der die berechtigten Nutzer sich einen geheimen
Schlu¨ssel teilen ko¨nnen. Wir verwenden Zweiweg-Kommunikation, um die
Auswirkungen der Dunkelza¨hlrate hinauszuzo¨gern und die Distanz wesentlich
zu vergro¨ßern. Zu diesem Zweck haben wir einen in Bezug auf die durch den
Lauscher verursachte Sto¨rung optimierten Angriff betrachtet. Jede andere
Art eines Angriffs wu¨rde die Sto¨rung erho¨hen. Wir zeigen, dass durch Ver-
wendung der Zweiweg-Kommunikation fu¨r die klassische Weiterverarbeitung
der Bits die Distanz fu¨r sichere Kommunikation wesentlich erho¨ht werden
kann.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
History 1 of cryptography is almost as ancient as that of writing. At all
times people have wished to communicate secretly without letting a third
party to over hear them. Archeological revelations have shown that various
cryptographic methods had been used by ancient civilizations in India, China
or Mesopotamia. Ancient Egyptians used modified hieroglyph to conceal
their message. Most hieroglyph used during that period were figurative. In
the 5th century BC Greeks designed a scytale device based on transposition
of letters. A strip of parchment or leather was rotated around a baton across
which the message was written. When the end of line was reached the baton
was rotated. After the parchment was removed the letters looked scrambled
and only a person possessing the baton of same size could recover the message.
Another important and easy cipher is the substitution cipher where each
letter in a message is substituted by another letter, word or symbol. A
good example is the Caesar cipher. Gaius Julius Caesar used this cipher to
communicate between Roman ligeons scattered among the Roman empire.
In this cipher each letter was advanced by three letters in alphabets i.e. A
was replaced by D, B by E, C by F and so on. During the middle ages
most ciphers were based on transposition or substitution or a combination
thereof. However none of them are secure because it is possible to break
them exploiting various characteristics of the language such as frequency of
individual letters and their clusters.
The invention of telegraphy in 1830’s started the beginning of modern
electronic communication between people. From the cryptographic point of
view it lacked secrecy as the message was known to the telegraph operator.
In order to keep the message secret from the operator, people and companies
designed various code books where significant words in the message were re-
1Most of the information about history of cyptography is taken from [Hen02, Sin01].
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placed by small nonsense words. If the code book is kept secret the telegraph
becomes a cipher.
In the twentieth century the two world wars accelerated the invention
of new cryptosystems. In 1917 Gilbert S. Vernam proposed a very simple
secret-key substitution cipher. Though it did not become as widespread as
Vernam had expected but it remains to be the only known cipher proven
to be unconditionally secure and will be discussed in detail in Sec. 1.1. In
1918, Arthur Scherbius invented an ingenious electric cipher machine, called
Enigma, which was patented a year later. The Enigma consisted of a set
of rotating wired wheels, which performed a very sophisticated substitution
cipher. After various improvements, it was adopted by the German Navy in
1926, the German Army in 1928, and the Air Force in 1935, and it was used
by the Germans and Italians throughout World War II. The military Enigma
had incredible 159× 1018 possible settings (cryptographic keys). When some
letter was repetitively keyed, the machine always produced a different letter
and the sequence started repeating only after 16900 keyings, when the inner
mechanism returned to the initial position. The immense number of poten-
tial keys led Alan Turing to construct the first electronic computer, which
helped break the Enigma ciphers in the course of the War. Thus cryptogra-
phy (or cryptanalysis to be more precise) was the driving force behind the
development of modern computers. Today a Pentium-based computer can
unscramble an Enigma-encrypted message within minutes.
1.1 Secret-key cryptography
Until 1970’s most cryptographic schemes were based on secret-key cryptosys-
tems, where the encrypting and decrypting ciphers were known to everybody
but secrecy was ensured by a secret key known only to the legitimate users.
These systems are also known as symmetric key cryptosystems as same key
is used for encryption and decryption. The distribution of secret key is the
main draw back of such systems.
The Vernam cipher
In 1917 Gilbert S. Vernam proposed an unbreakable secret-key cipher, the
one time pad or Vernam cipher. It is a special case of substitution cipher
where each alphabet of the message was replaced by a random alphabet.
This string of random alphabets then forms the secret key which must be
known to both sender and recipient. The principle of the cipher is that if
random bits are added to the message, the bits of the resulting string are
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Figure 1.1: Secret key cryptosystem: In order to send plain text ‘P’, Alice
prepares a cipher text C(P,K) using secret key ‘K’ and plain text ‘P’ via a
publicly known cryptogram. The cipher text is transmitted to Bob through a
public channel accessible to Eve. The key ‘K’ is sent through secret channel
to Bob. Bob decrypts the message using the secret key ‘K’ in a cryptogram
based on knowledge of Alice’s cryptogram and gets the plain text ‘P’.
also random and carry no information. For a binary logic, unlike Vernam
who used 26-letter alphabet, the encryption algorithm can be written as
CK(M) = (c1 = m1 ⊕ k1, c2 = m2 ⊕ k2, ...., cn = mn ⊕ kn), (1.1)
where M = (m1,m2, ....,mn) is the message and K = (k1, k2, ...., kn) is the
random key and ⊕ is addition modulo 2 or exclusive OR without carry. Since
addition modulo 2 is identity, therefore decryption can be done by adding
the same key as
M = Dk(C) = (c1 ⊕ k1, c2 ⊕ k2, ...., cn ⊕ kn). (1.2)
For the cipher to be secure, the key K must satisfy three conditions: (1) It
should be as long as the message, (2) it must be purely random and (3) it
must be used only once. The last condition gives the name one-time pad to
the cipher. Claude E. Shannon in 1949 proved that under above conditions
the Vernam cipher is unconditionally secure i.e. impossible to break by any
computational means.
Security of Vernam cipher
A simple proof of security of Vernam cipher can be given by probability
theory [Ran05]. Let M, K and C be random variables for the plain text, key
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and the cipher text, respectively. Eve receives the cipher text and tries to
extract the plain text from it, one finds that
P (M = mi|C = ci) = P (M = mi ∧ C = ci)
P (C = ci)
= P (M = mi). (1.3)
Eve has no knowledge about the key, therefore the probability that P (K =
ki) = d
−n where d is an exponential number and n is the length of the key
(and hence message). Therefore P (C = ci) = d
−n for Eve (by a perfect
realization M = mi), because the encryption function is bisection on sum
of all. C is now statistically independent of M, so the second equality is
justified.
Thus by intercepting the cipher text, due to the ignorance of key, Eve
gets no additional information than she a priori already has. Something
more formal can be deduced, that due to statistical independence of C and
M, the mutual information I(M : C) = 0.
Despite its unconditional security, the Vernam cipher faces the problem
how to securely distribute the key. This prevented it from being widely used.
However, it was used for various military and diplomatic purposes, where the
security outweighs the key management problem. It had been used by the
infamous spies Theodore A. Hall, Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs and others,
who were passing atomic secrets to Moscow. Che´ Guevara also encrypted his
messages to Fidel Castro by means of the one-time pad. It was employed in
securing the hot line between Washington and Moscow and it is said to be
used for communications between nuclear submarines and for some embassy
communications. However it lead to the revelations of atomic spies in WWII
because of the repetitive use of the key incorrectly prepared by the KGB.
Digital Encryption Standard
The most spread cryptosystem is the Digital Encryption Standard or DES
and its variations. It was developed in 1975 by IBM and US government.
It employs very simple arithmetic operations and hence can be easily imple-
mented into hardware. The algorithm uses a 56-bit key which is then reused
to encrypt the entire message, therefore it is only computationally secure. In
1997, RSA Data Security inc, published their first results to unscramble the
entire message encrypted by DES. They apply brute force to search the entire
space of 256 possible keys to search the key on large number of computers.
It took them 96 days to break it. However a DES search machine designed
by Micheal Wiener in 1993 based on 1997’s technology, would break DES in
3.5 hours [Wie97]. The same machine based on 2000’s technology would take
only 100 seconds. Cryptographers have then tried to improve the security of
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DES by developing modifications to it, namely Triple DES, DESX and more.
Since 2002, a new standard, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has
replaced the aging DES. However, with the advancement in computation it
is not going to last long either.
1.2 Public-key cryptography
The advancement in electronic communications prompted the need for more
secure ciphers between parties who have never met before. This resulted in
the development of public-key cryptosystems, also known as asymmetric-key
cryptosystem as separate key is used for encryption and decryption. Public-
key cryptography was invented in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin E.
Hellman. Public-key cryptography requires two keys: the public key and the
private key, which form a key pair. The recipient of a message generates two
keys, makes the public key public through a trusted authority and keeps his
private key in a secret place to ensure its private possession. The algorithm is
designed in such a way that anyone can encrypt a message using the public
key, however, only the legitimate recipient can decrypt the message using
his/her private key.
The security of public-key cryptography rests on various computational
problems, which are believed to be intractable. The encryption and decryp-
tion algorithms utilize the so-called one-way functions. One-way functions
are mathematical functions that are easy to compute in one direction, but
their inversion is very difficult. It is, for example, very easy to multiply two
prime numbers, but to factor the product of two large primes is already a
difficult task. Other public-key cryptosystems are based, for example, on
the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in Abelian groups on elliptic
curves or other finite groups. However, it is important to point out that no
one-way function has been proved to be one-way. Hence public-key cryp-
tography cannot provide unconditional security. It is only computationally
secure.
Today the most widely used public-key system is the RSA cryptosystem.
RSA was invented in 1977 by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adle-
man [RSA78], whose names form the acronym. RSA exploits the difficulty
of factoring large numbers. The receiver picks two large primes and makes
their product public. This product, called the modulus, becomes the public
key. Using this key, anyone can encrypt a message. However, in order to
invert the algorithm it is necessary to know the prime factors of the mod-
ulus. Although there are several ways to attack the RSA system, the most
promising one still seems to be to attempt to factor the modulus.
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Various public efforts have been made to attempt to develop fast fac-
torizing algorithms. A 512-bit number was factored in August 1999 by 292
computers. In 1999 Adi Shamir proposed the TWINKLE device. It is a
massively parallel optoelectronic factoring device and is about three orders
of magnitude faster than a conventional fast PC. It can facilitate the factor-
ing of 512- and 768-bit keys. Today it is already recommended to move to
longer key lengths and to use key sizes of 1024 bits for corporate use and
2048 bits for valuable keys.
Another threat to the security of public-key cryptosystems is the devel-
opment of quantum computers. The decryption using a quantum computer
would take about the same time as the encryption, thereby making public-key
cryptography worthless. Shor, in 1994 has already suggested an algorithm
capable of doing so [Sho94] and first experiments with small-scale quantum
computers [VS+01] successfully pave the way to more sophisticated devices.
1.3 Quantum cryptography
All conventional classical cryptographic techniques fail to assure uncondi-
tional security. The security of conventional techniques relies on the assump-
tion of limited advancement of mathematical algorithms and computational
power in the foreseeable future, and also on limited financial resources avail-
able to a potential adversary. Computationally secure cryptosystems, no
matter whether public- or secret-key, will always be threatened by break-
throughs, which are difficult to predict, and even steady progress of code-
breaking allows the adversary to reach “back in time” and break earlier
captured communications encrypted with weaker keys. This results in the
necessity to periodically re-encrypt re-sign certain documents, which are to
be of a longer lifetime, such as contracts etc., and to carefully sort information
according to the used cryptosystem.
Quantum mechanics provides a way of distributing secret messages with
unconditional security. It is based on known classical secret-key cryptosys-
tems and makes use of certain quantum mechanical properties to ensure
secure distribution of random and secret key. The main problem in classi-
cal secret-key cryptosystems had been the distribution of secret key. Even
the only proven unconditionally secure Vernam cipher relies on random se-
cret key which is to be distributed with each message. The security of all
the classical crypto methods is undermined by the advancement of technol-
ogy and computation. Quantum mechanics however provides a solution and
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distributes unconditionally secure key through open channel. The security
is guaranteed by basic laws of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg uncertainty
principle forbids simultaneous measurement of nonorthogonal states. In the
framework of classical physics it is impossible to reveal potential eavesdrop-
ping because information encoded in a state can be perfectly copied with-
out causing any disturbance to the state. Hence all classical signals can be
monitored passively. In classical communications one bit of information is
encoded simultaneously on many photons, atoms or electrons. Hence it is
always possible to passively listen to it by deviating a part of it or copying
it. However in quantum cryptosystems one bit of information is encoded on
single photon, atom or electron. In addition orthogonal states are used to
encode information. Any attempt to read it causes disturbance and hence
reveals eavesdropping. In addition linearity of quantum mechanics forbids
perfect copying of quantum states. Hence quantum systems eliminate the
side channels which cause drastic trouble in classical cryptosystems. These
vital quantum properties are discussed in detail in next chapter.
It is worth noting that quantum cryptography is based on classical pri-
vate key cryptosystems. Quantum cryptography solves the problem of key
distribution only. Hence it has been given the name quantum key distribution
(QKD). In general Vernam cipher (the one time pad) is used as the reliable
cryptosystem since its security is unconditionally proven, provided the key
is random and secret. Quantum key distribution protocols then ensure the
distribution of a key which remains unknown to a potential eavesdropper.
Since light travels faster with a small decoherence they are regarded as the
potential carriers of information. Various properties of photons can be used
to encode information such as polarization, phase, quantum correlations of
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs, wavelength or quadrature components
of squeezed state of light. The only requirement on the quantum states is
that they belong to mutually non-orthogonal bases of their Hilbert space,
where each vector in one basis has equal length-projection onto all vectors of
other basis (bases).
Quantum mechanics does not prevent all types of eavesdropping, it just
detects it and reveals the presence of eavesdropper. Since only the crypto-
graphic key is distributed this way and not the original message, no informa-
tion leak occurs. When discrepancies are found, the key is simply discarded
and the procedure is repeated again by users to generate another key.
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1.4 Thesis outline
Thesis consists of two different parts. First in part one, we discuss ideal
quantum key distribution protocols and their robustness in terms of provable
entanglement. The robustness bounds are proved for most general coherent
attacks. In general these bounds are already known for provable entangle-
ment as 25% for the four-state protocol and 33% for the six-state protocol.
We anticipate to provide a region in which the legitimate users share entan-
glement. This region is reduced to a line for six-state protocol because of
additional constraint on it. We also investigate the information cost which
Eve has to pay in order to reach these bounds.
In part two we adopt more practical approach. We investigate the limita-
tion on distance of secure communication because of practical restrictions. In
particular, we investigate the lack of single photon sources, the lossy channel
and faulty detectors. For the purpose we consider sources as weak coher-
ent pulses. The channels are the quantum channels where each single pulse
of photon behaves as single quanta and these channels are basically opti-
cal fibres. The detectors are threshold detectors, which are click or no click
detectors.
These practical limitations have already been observed using one-way
classical communication between legitimate users [Lut00]. It has been ob-
served that it is actually the dark counts that limit the distance up to which
legitimate users can share a secret key [FG+01]. Dark counts are the clicks on
detector even when there is no actual message. We have used two-way clas-
sical communication to postpone the effect of dark counts and increase the
distance considerably. For the purpose we have considered an optimal attack
which comprises of photon number splitting attack on all the multiphoton
pulses and a joint coherent attack on the single photon pulses. This attack is
optimal with respect to the disturbance that an eavesdropper creates while
attacking. Any other format of attacking will increase the disturbance. We
show that using two-way classical communication for post processing we can
increase the distance of secure communication to a considerable quantity.
In both above mentioned parts our approach is to consider entanglement
based versions of standard four- and six-state protocols.
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Chapter 2
Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) Protocols and Secure
Key Rates
In this chapter vital features of quantum key distribution (QKD) are ex-
plained which form the base for the work presented in chapters 3 and 4. In
Sec. 2.1 vital features of quantum mechanics are discussed which form a basis
for QKD protocols. Various QKD protocols are then described in detail in
Sec. 2.2. This includes the description of well known BB84, six-state and
decoy state protocol. Both prepare and measure and entanglement based
versions of the protocols is explained and the equivalence of the two versions
is then explored. In Sec. 2.3 security of QKD protocols is discussed which
includes the categorization of various attacks on a protocol. Two security
bounds namely Csiszar Ko¨rner and Shor-Preskill are discussed in detail which
are based on individual and coherent attacks respectively. They also provide
a bound on secure key rates.
2.1 Basic quantum features vital in quantum
key distribution
Orthogonality plays vital role in quantum key distribution. There are three
main properties of nonorthogonal states that make them ideal for key distri-
bution protocols.
• Information gain implies perturbation: In an attempt to distinguish
between two nonorthogonal states the information gain is only at the
expense of causing disturbance.
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Consider two non-orthogonal quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 about which
Eve is trying to get information. She attaches an ancilla say in initial
state |u〉 and let it unitarily interact with the unknown states |ψ〉 or
|φ〉. Assuming that this process does not cause any disturbance in the
two states, the interaction is given as
|ψ〉 |u〉 −→ |ψ〉 |v〉
|φ〉 |u〉 −→ |φ〉 |v′〉
Eve can determine the identity of states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 if |v〉 and |v′〉 are
different. But since inner products must be preserved under unitary
interaction one gets
〈ψ|φ〉〈u|u〉 = 〈ψ|φ〉〈v|v′〉
〈u|u〉 = 〈v|v′〉 = 1
which means that the states |v〉 and |v′〉 are identical and Eve cannot
distinguish between the nonorthogonal states ψ and φ. Thus distin-
guishing the two states must inevitably cause disturbance in one of
them.
• It is impossible to unambiguously determine two non orthogonal states:
There is no quantum measurement that can reliably distinguish be-
tween the nonorthogonal states.
Suppose there is a quantum measurement M which gives an outcome
m whenever the state is |ψ〉. But a state |φ〉 nonorthogonal to |ψ〉
has always a component parallel to |ψ〉 i.e. |φ〉 = α |ψ〉 + β |τ〉 where
|ψ〉 and |τ〉 are orthogonal and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Thus while making a
measurement on |φ〉 there is a non-zero probability |α|2 of getting an
outcome m. Thus sometimes one makes an error in determining which
state was prepared.
• Ideal copy of two nonorthogonal states is impossible: This is the no-
cloning theorem stating that it is impossible to copy an unknown quan-
tum state.
Suppose there is a quantum copier in an initial pure state |c〉 and it is
used to create a perfect copy of two nonorthogonal states |ψ〉 and |φ〉
by some unitary evolution U then
|ψ〉 |c〉 −→ |ψ〉 |ψ〉
|φ〉 |c〉 −→ |φ〉 |φ〉. (2.1)
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Taking inner product of above equations gives
〈ψ|φ〉 = (〈ψ|φ〉)2 (2.2)
But x = x2 has only two possible solutions, x = 1 or x = 0, so either
|ψ〉 = |φ〉 or |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are orthogonal. Thus a cloning device can
only clone states which are orthogonal to one another and therefore a
general quantum cloning device is impossible.
In general, even if one allows non-unitary cloning devices, cloning of
non-orthogonal states remains impossible, unless one is willing to toler-
ate a finite loss in fidelity. For a cloning machine with a blank copy |b〉
initially in state |0〉 producing a perfect copy of state |ψ〉, the evolution
is given as
|ψ〉 |b〉 |0〉 −→ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |fψ〉 (2.3)
where |fψ〉 denotes the final state of copying machine. For an orthog-
onal state |τ〉 the copying process is given as
|τ, b, 0〉 −→ |τ, τ, fτ 〉.
However for a superimposed state |φ〉 = ( |ψ〉+ |τ〉)/√2, the linearity
of quantum mechanics implies that
|φ, b, 0〉 = 1√
2
( |ψ〉+ |τ〉)⊗ |b, 0〉
−→ 1√
2
( |ψ, ψ, fψ〉+ |τ, τ, fτ 〉).
But the above obtained state is not the desired ideal copy |φ, φ, fφ〉
whatever the states |f〉 may be.
Quantum cryptography came into limelight by the introduction of Bennet-
Brassard four-state protocol in 1984, the BB84 protocol, based on the idea by
Wiesner in 1976. Various modified and new protocols have been introduced
so far which include the six-state protocol and decoy state protocols. Both
six-state and decoy state protocols have some advantages over the BB84 as
the former tolerates higher error rates and the latter is able to overcome pho-
ton number splitting attack. In each protocol secret key is established after
post processing. This involves (i) error correction or rejection to eliminate
the errors in the bit string and (ii) privacy amplification to eliminate Eve’s
information about the bit string. The length of the secret key string depends
on whether only Alice or Bob make an announcement (one- way classical
communication) or both do ( two-way classical communication). Key gen-
eration rate is hence defined as the ratio of the secret key string retained in
the end to the one originally sent by Alice.
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2.2 Quantum key distribution protocols
Each QKD protocol consists of three stages. In the distribution stage, Al-
ice encodes her random bit-string in a random sequence of non-orthogonal
signal states (e.g., polarized single photons). Such a preparation involves
two mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) in the four-state protocol and three in
the fully symmetric six-state protocol. A first raw key is established when
Bob measures each received signal at random in one of the possible bases
and registers his outcomes. In the sifting stage, Alice and Bob publicly an-
nounce the bases used in each measurement. They then reject all (ideally
half) bits originated from measurements in bases different from the prepa-
ration ones. Finally, Alice and Bob post-process this sifted key to distill a
secret key. The post-processing stage typically involves error-correction and
privacy amplification.
2.2.1 Prepare and measure four- and six-state proto-
cols
In the work presented in chapters 3 and 4 the conventional BB84 and six-
state protocols have been analyzed. Also decoy state protocols have been
considered for the key generation rates in practical QKD. It is therefore of
interest to explore these protocols.
BB84 protocol
In the prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol [BB84], Alice sends a sequence
of, say n qubits to Bob each of which is randomly prepared in one of the
basis states { |0〉, |1〉} or { |0¯〉, |1¯〉} which are eigenstates of two maximally
conjugated physical variables, namely the two Pauli spin operators Z and X .
The eigenstates of Z, i.e. { |0〉, |1〉}, and of X , i.e. { |0¯〉, |1¯〉}, are related by
the Hadamard transformation
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (2.4)
i.e. |¯i〉 = ∑jHij |j〉 (i, j ∈ {0, 1}). Thus |0¯〉 = ( |0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and
|1¯〉 = ( |0〉 − |1〉)/√2. In the computational basis { |0〉, |1〉}, the Pauli spin
operators are represented by the matrices
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (2.5)
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Alice’s random bases choice + × + + × ×
Alice’s random bit sequence 0 0 1 0 1 1
Bob’s random bases choice × × × + × +
Bob’s bit sequence 0 0 0 0 1 0
Bases announced publicly different same different same same different
Sifted key - 0 - 0 1 -
Table 2.1: BB84 protocol: Alice selects randomly from the rectilinear (+ or
{0, 1} ) and diagonal (× or {0¯, 1¯}) bases. She randomly selects the bit value
0 or 1. Bob randomly chooses the bases from the two and gets a particular
bit value. Alice and Bob announce the bases and discard the bits in which
bases were different. Almost 50% of the bits are discarded in this sifting
process. The remaining bits form the sifted key. In general the sifted key
is not totally identical owing to the presence of error rate due to noise or
eavesdropping.
Bob measures the received qubits randomly in one of the two bases. The
cases in which Alice and Bob used the same bases, the bit values are perfectly
correlated. However in the cases in which they chose different bases the bit
values are not correlated. Thus after the transmission stage there is 25%
error in Bob’s bit sequence. This error rate is too high to be corrected by
any error correction process. However after the transmission stage, Alice
and Bob apply a random permutation of their data and publicly discuss the
bases chosen, discarding all the bits where they have selected different bases.
In this way 50% of the bits are discarded but the key is free of the above
mentioned 25% error. This shorter key after basis reconciliation is called the
sifted key. The sifted key still contains some number of errors either due to
channel noise or because of an eavesdropping attack.
Subsequently, they randomly select a number of bits from the remain-
ing random key (sifted key) and determine their error probability or QBER.
Pessimistically Alice and Bob attribute all error (due to channel noise or
eavesdropping) to Eve. If the estimated QBER is too high the protocol
is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob perform error correction and pri-
vacy amplification with one- or two-way classical communication, in order
to obtain a smaller number of secret and perfectly correlated random bits
[BS94, BB+95, Mau93, GL03, Ch02].
Six-state protocol
The six-state prepare-and-measure scheme is quite similar to the BB84 (four-
state) scheme [Bru98]. More precisely, Alice and Bob use at random three
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bases namely, the two bases used in the BB84 plus an additional one { |0¯〉, |1¯〉}
which corresponds to the Y Pauli operator. In analogy to BB84, the three
bases are related (up to a global phase) via the transformation
T = 1√
2
(
1 −i
1 i
)
, (2.6)
i.e. |¯i〉 = ∑j Tij |j〉 and |¯i〉 = ∑j T 2ij |j〉 with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus |0¯〉 =
( |0〉+ i |1〉)/√2 and |1¯〉 = ( |0〉− i |1〉)/√2. During the sifting process 2/3rd
of the bits are discarded where Alice’s and Bob’s bases choice differ. This
is much more than 50% in BB84, hence the key generation rates are less in
six-state protocol than BB84. However six-state protocol is of advantage as
it can sustain higher error rates.
Decoy-state protocol
The lack of single photon pulses makes conventional BB84 and the six-state
protocols vulnerable to photon number splitting (PNS) attack. The light
source emits pulses in the form of weak coherent pulses (WCPs) with pois-
sonian photon number distribution, pi = exp(−µ)µi/i!, where µ is the mean
photon number. In PNS attack Eve gains full information of multiphoton
pulses, i ≥ 2. Such pulses are marked as tagged by Eve. The decoy state
protocol has the power to counteract such attacks. In decoy state protocol,
Alice randomly mixes up pulses from different laser sources which have dif-
ferent intensities. The essence of the decoy state protocol is this that the
yield of all pulses of different intensities is same. This essentially means that
the conditional probability that detector clicks when a single photon pulse
hits the detector is same for all intensities, the same is true for multiphoton
pulses. Hence Alice can estimate the fraction of multiphoton pulses hitting
the detector and presence of Eve by comparing different yields. A decoy
state protocol can be used both with two and three bases, the former being
a supplement of BB84 and latter that of six-state protocol.
Consider a decoy-state protocol involving two decoy weak coherent pulses
with mean photon numbers κ < ν fulfilling the additional requirement κ exp(−κ) <
ν exp(−ν), and a signal pulse with mean photon number µ > κ+ ν. There-
fore, the decoy pulses are detected with probabilities P
(κ)
exp and P
(ν)
exp obeying
the relations [Wan05, MQ+05]
P (κ)exp = P
dark
exp e
−κ + s1κe−κ + sm(1− e−κ − κe−κ),
P (ν)exp ≥ P darkexp e−ν + s1νe−ν + sm(1− e−κ − κe−κ)
ν2e−ν
κ2e−κ
.
(2.7)
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Thereby, sm is the conditional probability that the detector clicks provided
multiphoton pulse with mean photon number κ hits the detector, whereas
s1 is the corresponding probability for single-photon pulses. Using (2.7) one
obtains
s1 ≥
ν2eκP
(κ)
exp − κ2eνP (ν)exp − (ν2 − κ2)P darkexp
κν(ν − κ) := s1. (2.8)
The inequality in the second line of (2.7) is valid provided the inequalities κ <
ν and κ exp(−κ) < ν exp(−ν) are fulfilled. Correspondingly, the probability
∆µ of multiphoton signal pulses can be upper-bounded as follows
∆µ ≤ 1− s1µe
−µ
P
(µ)
exp
:= ∆˜µ. (2.9)
Thus Alice and Bob are able to estimate the fraction of multiphoton pulses,
using the decoy state protocol. This pessimistically estimated fraction is
much less than that in conventional four- and six-state protocols.
2.2.2 Error correction and privacy amplification
The distribution and measurement stage ends the quantum part of QKD pro-
tocols. As has been discussed above, the sifted key still contains errors arising
from channel noise or potential eavesdropping. Alice and Bob estimate this
error by first applying the random permutation. This random permutation
distributes the disturbance evenly among all bits. They then sacrifice part
of their data and announce the bit values for that part. The fraction of cases
in which bit values differ is the bit error rate. Due to random permutation
done above, Alice and Bob assume that the bit error rate in the remaining
sifted key is the same. Alice and Bob then need to do error correction or
data reconciliation on the remaining key so that both share the same key.
In addition Eve may know part of the key without causing any disturbance.
Some information about the key may also leak to Eve during error correction
process. In order to eliminate Eve’s information about the key Alice and
Bob must do privacy amplification. Both error correction and privacy am-
plification are done on classical channel and the discussion is done publicly.
Alice and Bob’s aim is thus to reveal as little information as possible to the
eavesdropper during error correction.
Error correction
Error correction process is the information reconciliation process which tends
to make Alice and Bob’s strings the same. As mentioned above very few bits
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must be sent over public channel in order to leak little information to Eve.
Many error correction protocols have been proposed but cascade protocol
suggested by Brassard and Salvail [BS94] is the most common in use and
it reveals very little information to Eve. This protocol runs in number of
rounds.
Cascade protocol
In the cascade protocol Alice and Bob first perform a random but identical
permutation of their bits to distribute the errors randomly. This random
permutation must be different for each round. They then arrange their bits
in blocks of fixed length. Alice then computes parity of each block and
announces it publicly. Bob computes the parity of his corresponding block
and announces ‘ok’ if it matches. In this case either the block contains zero
errors or even number of errors. They then move on to next block. In case
the parity does not match, Bob is sure there are odd number of errors in the
block. Bob then does binary (bisective) search i.e. he divides the block into
two halves and compares the parity of each half with Alice to locate whether
error occurs in first half or second. The half in which error is present is then
divided again and parity is compared. This process is repeated until the
error is located which Bob corrects by flipping the bit. If the flipped bit was
present in a previous block, it means that block had even number of errors
and yet another error is present in that block. Bob then applies binary search
to previous block and corrects the error. In order to reduce the information
revealed to Eve, Alice and Bob discard last bit of each block whose parity
was revealed. Before starting each round Alice and Bob randomly permute
their bit strings and then perform all steps again with an increased block
size.
After a large number of consecutive rounds, Alice and Bob’s bit strings
become errorless with high probability with Eve having partial knowledge
about the string. They then need to perform privacy amplification to elimi-
nate Eve’s information.
Privacy amplification
As has been stated earlier privacy amplification is a classical protocol done
on a public channel to eliminate Eve’s information about the key. In a typical
privacy amplification protocol Alice and Bob randomly permute the bits and
Alice pairs up the bits. She then announces which bits she has paired up.
They both then calculate the parity of their bits and keep the parity as their
key sequence. Since privacy amplification is done after error correction they
both have the same bit (parity) value. On the other hand if Eve knows
perfectly about one bit and nothing about the other, she knows nothing
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about the parity value. Even if she knows the value of both bits with 70%
probability, her information about parity bit is reduced to 0.702 + 0.302 =
58%. This process is repeated several times with Eve’s information reducing
at each step. The key length reduces to half at each step. In general more
complicated protocols are used which use larger blocks.
If error correction process fails to locate and correct an error, this process
yields a totally uncorrelated string. Key distillation would then not be suc-
cessful. Alice and Bob thus compare a part of their distilled key to check. If
there is a mismatch they run the error correction process again followed by
privacy amplification and get a shorter, correlated key.
More complicated and efficient privacy amplification processes are ran-
dom linear hashing. Alice randomly chooses a set of linearly independent
strings vj and announces them. The secret key bits then turn out to be
sj = vj · k, where k is the key.
Advantage Distillation
Using one-way error correction and privacy amplification methods Alice and
Bob can distill a secret key only if their mutual information is more than that
between Alice and Eve or Bob and Eve. However for the case when mutual
information between Alice and Bob is less than that between Alice and Eve,
Alice and Bob can run a two-way advantage distillation protocol in which
they gain an advantage over Eve despite the fact that their mutual informa-
tion is less than Eve. This protocol has been suggested by Maurer [Mau93].
The advantage distillation protocols are less efficient than privacy amplifica-
tion and are used only up to the point where one-way error correction and
privacy amplification can take over.
In a typical advantage distillation protocol Alice and Bob take advantage
of the authenticated channel to decide which realizations to keep whereas
Eve cannot influence this process. Alice picks up several instances in which
she gets the same bit value. She then announces the instances and not the
bit value to Bob. Bob replies yes only if he has the same bit value for all
those instances. For high error rate it is unlikely but for low error rate it is
more probable that Eve makes an error than Bob. Eve can only use majority
vote to decide. Thus Bob takes an advantage over Eve even if he starts with
less mutual information.
There is another bit iteration protocol given by Gander and Maurer
[GM94] which increases Bob’s information about Alice’s string more effi-
ciently than Eve. In this two-way protocol Alice and Bob randomize their
pairs and then pair up the bits. For each pair Alice announces the par-
ity. Bob computes the parity of his pair and announces OK if the parities
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match. For such cases they keep the second bit of the pair and discard the
first one to compensate for the information that might have leaked to Eve
by announcement of parity. For the case when parity does not match Alice
and Bob discard both pairs. The retained bit string is then used for another
round of parity checks.
2.2.3 Entanglement-based protocols
It has been shown that, from the point of view of an arbitrarily powerful
eavesdropper, each one of BB84 and six-state prepare-and-measure schemes
is equivalent to an entanglement-based QKD protocol [BBM92, LC99, SP00,
Lo01, LCA05, GP01, Lo01]. These latter forms of the protocols offer advan-
tages, in particular with respect to questions concerning their unconditional
security, and work as follows: Alice prepares each of, say 2n, entangled-qubit
pairs in a particular Bell state1, say |Ψ−〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A1B〉 − |1A0B〉) (where
the subscripts A,B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively). This state is in-
variant under any unitary transformation of the form UA ⊗ UB. Alice keeps
half of each pair and submits the other half to Bob after having applied a
random unitary transformation chosen either from the set {1,H} (two-basis
protocol) or from the set {1, T , T 2} (three-basis protocol). At the end of the
transmission stage, Alice announces publicly the transformations she applied
on the transmitted qubits and Bob reverses all of them. At this stage, in an
ideal scenario Alice and Bob would share 2n pairs in the state |Ψ−〉⊗2n. Due
to channel noise and the presence of a possible eavesdropper, however, at
the end of the transmission stage all the 2n entangled-qubit pairs will be
corrupted. In fact, they will be entangled among themselves as well as with
Eve’s probe. Thus, the next step for Alice and Bob is to estimate the number
of singlets among the 2n shared pairs (alternatively to estimate the fraction
of pairs which are in error). To this end, they apply a verification test which
proceeds as follows: Firstly, Alice and Bob permute randomly all the pairs,
distributing thus any influence of the channel noise and the eavesdropper
equally among all the pairs [GL03, SP00]. Afterwards, they randomly select
a number (say nc) of the pairs as check pairs, they measure each one of them
separately along a common basis and they publicly compare their outcomes.
The influence of channel noise or of an eavesdropper is thus quantified by the
average estimated QBER of the check pairs while, assuming that the check
pairs constitute a fair sample2, the estimated QBER applies also to the pairs
1The Bell states |Φ±〉 ≡ ( |0〉A ⊗ |0〉B ± |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B)/
√
2 and |Ψ±〉 ≡ ( |0〉A ⊗ |1〉B ±
|1〉A ⊗ |0〉B)/
√
2, form an orthonormal basis in the two-qubit Hilbert space.
2In general, a logarithmic scaling of the size of the random sample with the length of
Alice’s and Bob’s key, seems to be sufficient for security issues. See Ref. [LCA05] for a
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which contribute to the final key.
After the verification test all the check pairs are dismissed and, if the
QBER is too high the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob apply
an appropriate entanglement purification protocol (EPP) with classical one-
or two-way communication [DE+96, BD+96] on the remaining 2n−nc pairs,
in order to distill a smaller number of almost pure entangled-qubit pairs.
Finally, measuring these almost perfectly entangled-qubit pairs in a common
basis, Alice and Bob obtain a secret random key, about which an adversary
has negligible information.
2.2.4 Equivalence between prepare and measure and
the corresponding entanglement based protocols
Entanglement based protocols seem implausible to apply using present day
available technology. Alice and Bob need quantum memory to store all EPR
pairs until the end of error correction and privacy amplification. They then
make a measurement at the end of protocol to get a bit sequence. An ad-
ditional complexity compared to prepare and measure protocols arises in
preparing EPR states. However entanglement based protocols are easier to
be analyzed theoretically. One can get security proofs of entanglement based
protocols. An important aspect of entanglement based protocols is that, from
point of view of an arbitrary Eve, they are equivalent to the corresponding
prepare and measure protocols. It is because of this equivalence the secu-
rity proofs of entanglement based protocols in turn mean that of prepare
and measure ones. This equivalence is proved and discussed in particular in
[SP00, GL03].
If the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) has special properties then
proving the security of prepare and measure protocol can be reduced to
proving that of EDP. Shor and Preskill [SP00] considered EDP’s with one-way
classical communication which are equivalent to quantum-error correction
codes, and furthermore, they considered the specific class of codes known
as Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes. Gottesman and Lo [GL03] have
described how a similar reduction can be applied to EDP’s with two-way
classical communication. Like any quantum error correction code, a CSS
code can correct both bit errors (pairs with Z ⊗ Z = −1 ) and phase errors
(pairs with X ⊗X = −1). But the crucial property of CSS codes is that the
bit and phase error correcting procedures can be decoupled i.e. Z errors can
be corrected without knowing anything about the X errors and vice-versa.
In the EDP protocols the key is affected by the bit error correction but
rigorous proof.
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not by the phase error correction. The phase error correction is only there to
expunge Eve’s entanglement with Alice and Bob. What is important is not
that phase error correction is actually done but rather it would have been
successful if it had been done. The EDP should be such that phase error
syndrome (Z-errors) measurement operators, the (X type operators) must
commute with the bit error syndrome measurement operators (the Z-type
operators). This way the X-type operators can be moved to the end and
actually need not be applied practically. The X- type operators need a quan-
tum computer as they involve Hadamard transform which has no classical
analog. Thus the elimination of application of X-type operation eliminates
the need for a quantum computer and it makes the two type of protocols
equivalent. Rather than first carrying out the EDP and then measuring Z
for each of the k distilled pairs, Alice and Bob can instead measure Z for
each of n noisy pairs, and then do classical post processing of their measure-
ment results to extract the final key. In this form, the entanglement-based
protocol becomes equivalent to corresponding prepare and measure one.
2.3 Security of QKD protocols
As has been stated above there are various stages in a QKD protocol, from
distribution to purification. Mainly one can divide a key generation protocol
in two phases .
Phase I
Phase I consists of distribution of key bits from Alice to Bob, Eve’s attacks
during this distribution and sifting of key bits to estimate the disturbance or
extent of noise caused by Eve or by faulty apparatus.
Phase II
Phase II consists of purifying the key bits generated in phase I. It consists
of error correction or rejection to make the bit values at Alice and Bob the
same followed by privacy amplification to eliminate Eve’s knowledge about
Alice and Bob data.
Security is based on how closely Alice and Bob can convert the data
obtained in phase I to a secret key in phase II. In prepare and measure
versions of QKD protocols Alice initially encodes the data and sends the
encoded bits to Bob. They both then decode the data with information going
one-way (one-way local operation and classical communication, LOCC) i.e.
either from Alice to Bob or Bob to Alice, or two-way (two-way LOCC) i.e.
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both from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice. Security and bound on key rate
is investigated from point of view of entanglement based versions of QKD
protocols.
2.3.1 Various attacks on ideal protocols
There are many security proofs and bounds on key rate depending on what
attacks Eve can perform as well as convenience of analyzing these attacks.
In principle there are three kinds of assumptions on Eve’s attacks.
Individual or incoherent attacks
In individual attacks, Eve attaches an individual probe to each qubit and then
measures each probe separately. For such attacks it is assumed that Eve only
waits until the end of basis reconciliation part to make a measurement on
her probe. Since this measurement is independent on each probe, she cannot
gain more information even if she delays her measurement until the end of
public discussion of error correction and privacy amplification. These are the
least powerful attacks but are most convenient in analysis as in such attacks
signals are not correlated and problem can be reduced to a classical one.
Collective attacks
In these attacks Eve attaches separate probe to each signal pulse as in in-
dividual attacks. She then measures all the probes collectively. Quantum
estimation theory implies that collective attacks are powerful compared to
individual attacks as Eve can gain more information. In analysis they are
also convenient as they also do not allow correlations between signals. How-
ever in these attacks Eve waits until the very end of protocol which involves
basis reconciliation, error correction and privacy amplification, to make a
measurement.
Coherent or joint attacks
These are the most powerful attacks and are the worst case scenario. Here
Eve attaches a single probe to all signal pulses and she has access to all
signal pulses at the same time. In the end she has a single high dimensional
state which she can measure by a single probe. Such attacks are difficult to
analyze as Alice and Bob’s signals can be correlated among themselves and
with Eve’s probe in any possible way. In addition like collective attacks Eve
makes a measurement at the end of Basis reconciliation, error correction and
privacy amplification.
2.3Security of QKD protocols 32
2.3.2 Security bounds based on various attacks
An effort has been made to give a security bound on various protocols. The
security bound comprises up to which disturbance or error rate, secret key
can be distilled. These bounds are given for various attacks based on ease
and complexity of their analysis. The first bound is given by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [CK78] which is based on individual attack. Later Shor and Preskill
[SP00] gave a more compact bound based on coherent attacks. Both these
bounds are based on one-way error correction and privacy amplification.
Csisza´r-Ko¨rner Bound
The first bound on secure key generation rate was given by Csiszar and
Ko¨rner [CK78] which is based on classical probability theory. It gives a
lower bound on secret key generation rate. Since classical probability theory
does not allow correlations between signals, this bound is valid only if Eve is
restricted to individual or incoherent attacks. This bound states that secret
key can be established between Alice and Bob if mutual information between
Alice and Bob, I(A,B) is greater than that between Eve and Alice I(A,E)
or Eve and Bob I(B,E) i.e. if
I(A,B) ≥Max{I(A,E)|I(B,E)} (2.10)
where I(A,B) = H(A) − H(A|B). Here H(x) is the Shannon entropy and
is given as H(x) = −xlog2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x). This bound is valid if
Alice and Bob use one-way classical communication for data post processing
which includes error correction and privacy amplification. For two-way post
processing they can distill a secret key even if Alice and Bob start with less
mutual information than Eve.
In order to get a lower bound on BB84 protocol one has to analyze the op-
timum incoherent strategy by Eve. This strategy was first reported by Fuchs
et. al [FG+97], however a simple derivation was given by Cirac and Gisin
[CG97] who used symmetry argument to get the same results. In this attack
Eve attaches a probe in an initial state |E〉 to the qubits flying to Bob. She
then lets the probe evolve into distinct probe states depending on the state of
Bob’s qubit with which it has interacted. The probe is then stored until the
basis are announced, so that Eve can increase her chance of distinguishing
the probe and hence Bob’s qubit by choosing the best measurement for that
particular basis. In addition Eve tries to minimize disturbance or error rate
to make the qubit that Bob receives to be as close as possible to that sent
by Alice. This attack is not possible using present day available technology
since Eve needs quantum memory with large decoherence time to store the
33
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Protocols and Secure Key
Rates
ancilla (probe) as Alice and Bob can delay the announcement of bases to an
infinite time. The unitary evolution in {0, 1} basis is given as follows
|0B〉 ⊗ |E〉 −→ |0B〉 ⊗ |E00〉+ |1B〉 ⊗ |E01〉 (2.11)
|1B〉 ⊗ |E〉 −→ |0B〉 ⊗ |E10〉+ |1B〉 ⊗ |E11〉. (2.12)
Similar interactions can be given for {0¯, 1¯} basis with Eve’s states given by
Ei¯j¯ where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The first kets on right hand side of above equations,
after tracing out Eve’s states, form the mixed state Bob will receive and the
second kets after tracing out Bob form the mixed state of Eve. The probe
states Eij are not normalized yet. The above two interactions can be written
more neatly as( |0〉
|1〉
)
⊗ |E〉 −→
( |0〉
|1〉
)
⊗
(
E00 E01
E10 E11
)
(2.13)
Above probe state matrix E =
(
E00 E01
E10 E11
)
in one basis can be trans-
formed into the other by Hadamard transformation given as
E¯ = HEH†, (2.14)
where H is the Hadamard transformation matrix given in Eq. (2.4).
Introducing the symmetry part of the argument, there are two types of
symmetries to be followed by Eve:
1. Symmetry between bits: Eve doesn’t know the bit value during trans-
mission, so the bits |0〉 and |1〉 are attacked the same way by Eve. This
requires that the overlaps between Eve’s probes must remain invariant
under the change of indices 0←→1 i.e. 〈E01|E11〉 = 〈E10|E00〉
2. Symmetry between bases: The bases are announced after Eve’s attack
so bits in both bases are attacked the same way. Thus symmetry re-
quires that overlaps between Eve’s probe must remain invariant under
the exchange of bases e.g. 〈E01|E11〉 = 〈E0¯1¯|E1¯1¯〉
Now imposing normalization and unitarity on Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12) it
requires
〈E00|E00〉+ 〈E01|E01〉 = 1 (2.15)
〈E10|E10〉+ 〈E11|E11〉 = 1 (2.16)
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From symmetry argument 1 and defining new parameters F and D one
gets
〈E00|E00〉 = 〈E11|E11〉 ≡ F
〈E01|E01〉 = 〈E10|E10〉 ≡ D (2.17)
where F + D = 1. Now for j ∈ {0, 1},〈j|TrEU |j〉 ⊗ |E〉〈E| ⊗ 〈j| U † |j〉,
defines the probability that Bob receives the qubit undisturbed. Therefore F
is the fidelity and D is the disturbance or error rate which is the probability
that Bob receives the qubit disturbed.
Now from taking overlaps of Eqs. (2.11) and (2.12) and requiring unitarity
i.e. the preservation of overlap before and after interaction one gets
〈E00|E10〉+ 〈E01|E11〉 = 0. (2.18)
Since the overlaps are real i.e. 〈E00|E10〉 = 〈E10|E00〉 (overlaps can be made
real by proper choice of phase) above equation reduces to
〈E00|E10〉 = 0
〈E11|E01〉 = 0. (2.19)
Thus probe states Eii ⊥ Eji and Eii ⊥ Eij for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {0, 1}, hence
Eve can fully discriminate between these orthogonal states. Defining the
remaining overlaps as
〈E00|E11〉 = 〈E11|E00〉 ≡ H
〈E01|E10〉 = 〈E10|E01〉 ≡ G (2.20)
Now converting Eve’s probe’s states into {0¯, 1¯} basis using Eq. (2.14) and
using symmetry between the bases we get
F −D = H +G. (2.21)
Eqs (2.11) and 2.12 can be now rewritten with normalized probe states Eˆij
as
|0B〉 ⊗ |E〉 −→
√
F |0B〉 ⊗ |Eˆ00〉+
√
D |1B〉 ⊗ |Eˆ01〉 (2.22)
|1B〉 ⊗ |E〉 −→
√
D |0B〉 ⊗ |Eˆ10〉+
√
F |1B〉 ⊗ |Eˆ11〉. (2.23)
We see that Bob’s states are entangled with Eve’s states. There is a proba-
bility F that Bob receives the same bit as Alice. In this case Eve gets away
without causing any disturbance. This does not mean that Eve knows the
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Figure 2.1: Binary symmetric channel: Figure shows a binary symmetric
channel which consists of two states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 with equal probability Pc
of correct guess and probability 1 − Pc that state is incorrectly guessed or
practically flipped from |ψ1〉 to |ψ2〉 and vice versa.
state correctly. She has to distinguish between four density matrices. Eve’s
mixed states are given as
ρi = TrBU |iB〉 |E〉〈E| 〈iB| U †, (2.24)
for i ∈ {0, 1, 0¯, 1¯}. But since she stores her probe until the bases are an-
nounced, the problem reduces to distinguishing two density matrices in that
basis. For announcement of {0, 1} basis, Eve’s density matrices are
ρ0 = F |Eˆ00〉〈Eˆ00| +D |Eˆ01〉〈Eˆ01| (2.25)
ρ1 = F |Eˆ11〉〈Eˆ11| +D |Eˆ10〉〈Eˆ10| . (2.26)
From orthogonality relations 2.19 that Eve has two orthogonal sets of states
i.e. {Eˆ00, Eˆ11} and {Eˆ01, Eˆ10}. The first set occurs with probability F and
second with probability D. Since the sets are orthogonal Eve can device a
measurement to tell her probe state belongs to which set. She can thus tell
whether she has caused a disturbance. Next she has to perform a measure-
ment to discriminate between two states, generally nonorthogonal, within
a set. For two states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, the probability of guessing the state
correctly is
Pc =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2. (2.27)
Now states in each set represent a binary symmetric channel which keeps
|ψi〉 ←→ |ψi〉 with probability Pc and flips |ψ1〉 ←→ |ψ2〉 with probability
1− Pc. Such a channel is given in Figure 2.1
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For such a case maximum information gain is given as
I = 1−H(Pc) (2.28)
Thus the total information gained by Eve is
I(B|E) = F (1−H(P Fc )) +D(1−H(PDc )) (2.29)
where P Fc = 1/2+1/2
√
1− |〈Eˆ00|Eˆ11〉|2 and PDc = 1/2+1/2
√
1− |〈Eˆ01|Eˆ10〉|2
and from Eqs. (2.17) and (2.20) we have
〈Eˆ00|Eˆ11〉 = H
F
〈Eˆ01|Eˆ10〉 = G
D
(2.30)
The information gain given in Eq. (2.29) is maximized for fixed disturbance
D when PDc = P
F
c . From F +D = 1
I(B|E)max = 1−H(PDc ) (2.31)
and from F +D = G +H it can be expressed in terms of single parameter
D as
I(B|E)max = 1−H
(
1
2
+
√
D(1−D)
)
. (2.32)
Eve’s information gain is zero for zero disturbance, it increases with increas-
ing disturbance until she gets full information i.e. I(B|E) = 1 for D = 1/2.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is simply that on a binary
symmetric channel with probability of flip D, hence their information gain
is given as
I(A|B) = 1−H(D) (2.33)
Equating Eqs. (2.32) and (2.33) we get the threshold disturbance D = D0 up
to which Alice and Bob can distill a secret key using one-way error correction
and privacy amplification
I(A|B) = I(B|E)max ⇔ D = D0 = 1− 1/
√
2
2
' 15% (2.34)
Since above attack is optimum therefore for any individual attack for QBER
or disturbance above 15% BB84 protocol becomes insecure and either Alice
and Bob have to abort the protocol or look for two-way error correction and
privacy amplification.
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Csizar-Ko¨rner bound given above has some limitations. First it is valid
only when Alice and Bob use one-way classical communication for error cor-
rection and privacy amplification. It has been shown that for two-way post
processing like advantage distillation, Alice and Bob can distill a secret key
even if they start with less mutual information than that between Eve and
Alice or Bob. In fact it has been shown that two-way error correction and
privacy amplification is able to distill secret key for QBER up to 30% for
optimal individual coherent attacks. In addition above bound is based on
classical probability theory. The classical probability theory does not allow
correlations between signals so Csiszar and Ko¨rner bound is not valid for
general quantum key distribution (QKD). In QKD it can only be applied if
Eve is restricted to individual attacks where signals are not correlated. In
principle one cannot force Eve to make a measurement. She may delay her
measurement till the very end of protocol and hence remain entangled with
Alice and Bob. Thus a quantum approach is needed to analyze coherent or
collective attacks.
Shor-Preskill bound
The simplest quantum approach to give a lower bound on secure key rate is
used by Shor and Preskill [SP00]. Their idea is based on Lo-Chau [LC99]
argument that high fidelity implies low entropy and entropy is a bound on
mutual information [NC00]. Hence in order to generate a secret key one
needs to generate high fidelity EPR pairs. Shor and Preskill have given an
entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane
code CSS code) (Calderbank and Shor [CS96] and Steane [Ste96]). These
codes divide the errors into bit and phase errors, where bit errors refer to the
disturbance caused by channel or noise and phase errors to Eve’s correlation.
Thus a channel either applies σx or X for bit error or a σz or Z operator for
phase error on each signal qubit pair or an identity operator. In order to get
high fidelity EPR pairs Alice and Bob need to correct these bit and phase
errors.
In a CSS code, classical linear codes C1 and C
⊥
2 are used for bit and phase
error correction respectively, where C2 ⊂ C1. the entanglement based proto-
col is secure if with high probability i.e. probability of success exponentially
close to unity, C1 can correct the bit errors and C
⊥
2 can correct the phase
errors. In the corresponding prepare and measure protocol, C1 is used to
correct bit errors and C2 to amplify privacy. Specifically, Alice transmits the
random string w through the quantum channel, randomly selects a codeword
u of C1 and announces u+w. Bob receives the corrupted string u+ e, com-
putes u + e, and corrects to u. The final key is the coset u + C2 of C2 in
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C1.
If this method is used to compute the final key in the prepare and measure
protocol, and if the key being distributed is very long, at what asymptotic
rate can secure final key be extracted from the sifted key? The answer is the
rate k/n at which high-fidelity pairs can be distilled from noisy pairs in the
EDP, which depends on how noisy pairs are. The purpose of the verification
test included in the protocol is to obtain a reliable estimate of the noise.
In the EDP, a useful way to characterize the noise is to imagine that, after
the final Hadamard transformations are applied to the pairs, all n pairs are
measured in the Bell basis i.e. both Z ⊗ Z and X ⊗ X are measured. If
there were no noise at all, we would find Z ⊗Z = X ⊗X = 1 for every pair.
Denote by nδ˜ the number of pairs for which we have Z⊗Z = −1 instead; we
say that δ˜ is the bit error rate of the noisy pairs. Denote by nδ˜p the number
of pairs for which we have X ⊗ X = −1; we say that δ˜p is the phase error
rate of the pairs.
For a given set of n pairs, the rates δ˜ and δ˜p are actually random vari-
ables, because the quantum measurement of the pairs is undeterministic.
But suppose that from the verification test, we can infer that for sufficiently
large n and any ² > 0, the inequalities δ˜ < δ + ² and δ˜p < δp + ² are sat-
isfied with high probability. Furthermore we may imagine that the key bits
are subjected to a publicly announced random permutation (or equivalently
that the CSS code is randomized), so that the bit and phase errors are ran-
domly distributed among the qubits. It can then be shown [Ham04] that for
sufficiently large n and any ²´ > 0, there exists a CSS code such that the EDP
distills k high-fidelity pairs from the n noisy pairs, where
k/n > 1−H2(δ + ²+ ²´)−H2(δp + ²+ ²´), (2.35)
and H2(δ) = −δ log2 δ − (1 − δ) log2(1 − δ) is the binary entropy function.
Therefore in the prepare and measure protocol, we establish an asymptot-
ically achievable rate of extraction of secure final key from sifted key “key
generation rate”:
R = 1−H2(δ)−H2(δp) (2.36)
That is in the protocol H2(δ) of the sifted key bits are asymptotically sacri-
ficed to perform error correction andH2(δp) of the sifted key bits are sacrificed
to do privacy amplification.
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Chapter 3
Bounds on Performance of
QKD Protocols
It has been shown that legitimate users must share provable entanglement as
a necessary condition for security. Thus for both four- and six-state proto-
cols, there is some maximum (threshold) disturbance or error probability up
to which quantum correlations exist between Alice and Bob. In this chapter
this threshold disturbance for the above mentioned protocols is investigated.
This investigation is done for most general coherent attacks. In addition, the
conditions under which Eve can reach these bounds and break the security,
are thoroughly studied. This analysis is done under the assumption of in-
coherent attacks and two-qubit coherent attacks. The analysis done in this
chapter is based on ideal QKD protocols where practical limitations are not
taken into consideration. This later consideration is taken into account in
chapter 4.
In Sec. 3.1, the threshold disturbance up to which legitimate users share
provable entanglement is calculated for both BB84 and six-state protocols.
This threshold disturbance incorporates the most general coherent attack by
Eve. It is then explored in Sec. 3.2 at what price in terms of information gain
and probability of correct guess can Eve disentangle Alice and Bob. For the
purpose incoherent attacks and two-qubit coherent attacks are considered
for both BB84 and six-state. In Sec. 3.3 link between classical and quan-
tum distillation protocols is made by showing that, at least in the context
of incoherent attacks, a two-way classical protocol, the so-called advantage
distillation protocol, exists which can tolerate precisely the same amount of
disturbance as a quantum purification protocol.
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3.1 Provable entanglement and threshold dis-
turbances
According to a recent observation, a necessary precondition for secret key dis-
tillation is that the correlations established between Alice and Bob during the
state distribution cannot be explained by a separable state [CLL03, AG05].
Throughout this chapter, it is considered that Alice and Bob focus on the
sifted key during the post-processing (i.e., they discard immediately all the
polarization data for which they have used different bases) and that they
treat each pair independently. Thus, according to the aforementioned pre-
condition, given a particular value of the estimated QBER (observable), the
task of Alice and Bob is to infer whether they share provable entanglement or
not. Thereby, entanglement is considered to be provable if Alice’s and Bob’s
correlations cannot be explained by a separable state within the framework
of the protocols (including post-processing) and observables under consider-
ation.
Recently [NA05], for the same post-processing, it was estimated the
threshold disturbance for provable entanglement in the context of two-basis
qudit-based QKD protocols under the assumption of joint eavesdropping at-
tacks. In particular, it was shown that for estimated disturbances below
(d − 1)/2d (where d is the size of the information carriers), Alice and Bob
can be confident that they share provable entanglement with probability ex-
ponentially close to one. For the sake of completeness, in this section, the
main steps of the proof are recapitulated and adapted to the BB84 scheme.
Subsequently, along the same lines, the corresponding threshold disturbance
is estimated for the six-state QKD scheme. For the sake of consistency,
the entanglement-based versions of the protocols are adopted. However, the
estimated threshold disturbances characterize both versions of the protocols.
3.1.1 Four-state protocol
Given the unitarity and hermiticity of H, the average disturbance (average
error probability per qubit pair), that Alice and Bob estimate during the
verification test is given by [GL03, NA05, SP00]
D =
1
2nc
∑
b=0,1
nc∑
ji;i=1
TrA,B
{[HbAB P HbAB]ji ρAB}, (3.1)
with the projector1
1Note that in the absence of noise and eavesdropping each pair of qubits shared between
Alice and Bob is in the Bell state |Ψ−〉. Thus, in this ideal scenario, Alice and Bob obtain
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Pji =
∑
l=0,1
|lA, lB〉〈lA, lB| = |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + |Φ−〉〈Φ−| (3.2)
and HbAB ≡ HbA ⊗ HbB. The last equality in (3.2) indicates that the verifi-
cation test is nothing more than a quality-check test of the fidelity of the
2n pairs with respect to the ideal state |Ψ−〉⊗2n [GL03, LC99, SP00, Lo01,
LCA05, GP01, Lo01]. The state ρAB in Eq. (3.1) denotes the reduced density
operator of Alice and Bob for all 2n pairs while the index ji indicates that
the corresponding physical observable refers to the ji-th randomly selected
qubit pair. The powers of the Hadamard transformationsHb, with b ∈ {0, 1},
reflect the fact that the errors in the sifted key originate from measurements
in both complementary bases which have been selected randomly by Alice
and Bob with equal probabilities.
As has been mentioned earlier, one of the crucial cornerstones for the
unconditional security of the protocol is that Eve does not know in advance
which pairs will be used for quality checks and which pairs will contribute
to the final key. Thus she is not able to treat them differently and the check
pairs constitute a classical random sample of all the pairs [GL03, LC99, SP00,
Lo01]. To ensure such a homogenization, Alice and Bob permute all of their
pairs randomly before the verification stage. In view of this homogenization,
the eavesdropping attack (although a joint one) becomes symmetric on all the
pairs [GL03, SP00] i.e., ρ
(1)
AB = ρ
(2)
AB = · · · = ρ(2n)AB . Here, the reduced density
operator of Alice’s and Bob’ s k-th pair is denoted by ρ
(k)
AB = Tr
(6k)
AB(ρAB)
and Tr
(6k)
AB indicates the tracing (averaging) procedure over all the qubit pairs
except the k-th one. Accordingly, the average estimated disturbance (3.1)
reads [NA05]
D =
1
2
1∑
b=0
Tr
(j1)
A,B
{[
(HbA ⊗HbB) P (HbA ⊗HbB)
]
j1
ρ
(j1)
AB
}
(3.3)
where Tr
(j1)
A,B denotes the tracing procedure over the j1-th qubit pair of Alice
and Bob. So, an arbitrary eavesdropping attack which gives rise to a par-
ticular reduced single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB is indistinguishable, from the point of
view of the estimated average disturbance, from a corresponding collective
(individual) attack which results in a decorrelated 2n-pair state of the form⊗2n
j=1 ρ
(j)
AB.
perfectly anticorrelated measurement results whenever they perform their measurements
along the same basis
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Our purpose now is to estimate the threshold disturbance Dth such that
for any estimated D < Dth Alice and Bob can be confident that their correla-
tions cannot have emerged from a separable state. To this end let us explore
the symmetries underlying the observable under consideration i.e., the es-
timated average QBER. According to Eqs. (3.3) and (3.2), D is invariant
under the transformations
(l, b) → (l ⊕2 1, b),
(l, b) → (l, b⊕2 1), (3.4)
where ⊕2 denotes addition modulo 2. This invariance implies that the re-
duced density operators ρ
(j1)
AB and
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
8
∑
g∈G1,h∈G2
U(h)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(h)† (3.5)
give rise to the same observed value of the QBER [NA05]. The unitary and
hermitian operators appearing in Eq. (3.5) form unitary representations of
two discrete Abelian groups G1 = {g1, g2, g3, g4} and G2 = {h1, h2}, and are
given by
U(g1) = XA ⊗XB, U(g2) = ZA ⊗ZB,
U(g3) = −YA ⊗ YB, U(g4) = 1A ⊗ 1B, (3.6)
and
U(h1) = HA ⊗HB, U(h2) = 1A ⊗ 1B. (3.7)
Moreover, invariance of the average QBER under the symmetry transfor-
mations of Eq. (3.4) induces invariance of ρ˜
(j1)
AB under both discrete Abelian
groups G1 and G2.
The key point is now that ρ
(j1)
AB and ρ˜
(j1)
AB differ by local unitary operations
and convex summation. Thus the density operator ρ
(j1)
AB is entangled if ρ˜
(j1)
AB
is entangled. Our main problem of determining the values of the QBER for
which Alice and Bob share provable entanglement can be reduced therefore to
the estimation of the values of D for which the most general two-qubit state
ρ˜
(j1)
AB (which is invariant under both Abelian discrete groups) is entangled.
The hermitian operators U(g1) and U(g2) of the group G1 constitute al-
ready a complete set of commuting operators in the Hilbert space of two qubits
and the corresponding eigenstates are the Bell states, |Φ±〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A0B〉 ±
|1A1B〉) and |Ψ±〉 ≡ 1√2( |0A1B〉 ± |1A0B〉), which form an orthonormal basis
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in the two-qubit Hilbert space. Thus, the most general two-qubit state which
is invariant under the Abelian group G1 is given by
ρ˜
(j1)
AB = λ00 |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + λ10 |Φ−〉〈Φ−|
+ λ01 |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| + λ11 |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| , (3.8)
with λαβ ≥ 0 and ∑
α,β∈{0,1}
λαβ = 1, (3.9)
while additional invariance under the discrete group G2 implies that
λ01 = λ10. (3.10)
Thus, the state (3.8) with the constraint (3.10) is the most general two-qubit
state invariant under the Abelian groups G1 and G2.
For later convenience let us rewrite the state ρ˜
(j1)
AB in the computational
basis, i.e.
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
2

D 0 0 G
0 F H 0
0 H F 0
G 0 0 D
 , (3.11)
with F = 1 −D denoting the so-called fidelity, i.e. the total probability for
Bob to receive the submitted signal undisturbed. Furthermore, the remaining
parameters are given by
D = λ00 + λ10, F = λ01 + λ11,
G = λ00 − λ10, H = λ01 − λ11, (3.12)
with D denoting the disturbance (QBER). In general, the parameters G
and H can be expressed in terms of the overlaps between different states of
Eve’s probe and are thus intimately connected to the eavesdropping strategy.
The key point for the subsequent discussion, is that for the estimation of
the threshold disturbance it is not required to know the explicit form of
the “macroscopic” parameters G and H and their detailed dependencies on
Eve’s attack. More precisely, using Eqs. (3.12), the constraints (3.9) and
(3.10) read
F +D = 1 (3.13)
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F +H = D −G (3.14)
respectively, while non-negativity of the eigenvalues λαβ implies
D ≥ |G|, (3.15)
F ≥ |H|. (3.16)
The possible values of the estimated disturbance for which ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entan-
gled can be estimated by means of the fully-entangled fraction (see [NA05])
or the Peres-Horodecki criterion [Pe96, HHH96]. Using the latter, we have
that ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable if and only if the inequalities
D ≥ |H|, (3.17)
F ≥ |G|, (3.18)
are satisfied. As depicted in Figure 3.1, these last inequalities combined with
inequalities (3.15), (3.16) and Eqs. (3.13), (3.14) imply that the symmetrized
state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled if and only if the estimated QBER is below 1/4 or
above 3/4. Given, however, that the states ρ˜
(j1)
AB and ρ
(j1)
AB are related via
local operations and convex summation, the original single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB
must also be entangled in the same regime of parameters. Moreover, the
probability that the QBER has been underestimated during the verification
test is exponentially small in nc. Hence one may conclude that, whenever
Alice and Bob detect an average QBER below 1/4 (or above 3/4), they can
be confident that they share entanglement with probability exponentially
close to one (∼ 1− 2−nc), and their correlations cannot have originated from
a separable state. The necessary precondition for secret-key distillation is
therefore fulfilled for estimated disturbances within these intervals.
On the contrary, for 1/4 ≤ D ≤ 3/4, ρ˜(j1)AB is separable. Of course, this
does not necessarily imply that ρ
(j1)
AB is also separable. But it does indi-
cate that in this regime of parameters, Alice’s and Bob’s correlations within
the framework of the BB84 protocol can be explained by a separable state,
namely by ρ˜
(j1)
AB . So, according to [CLL03, AG05], this implies that Alice and
Bob cannot extract a secret key and must abort the protocol. From now on
the focus is on the regime of practical interest (F ≥ D), where the lowest
possible threshold disturbance (Dth = 1/4) is attained for G = H = −1/4.
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Figure 3.1: BB84 protocol: Region of the independent parameters D(QBER)
and H for which the two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable (shaded region). The
various constraints that these parameters satisfy are indicated by straight
dotted lines. Specifically, (a) Eq. (3.17); (b) Eq. (3.16); (c) Eqs. (3.15) and
(3.13), (3.14); (d) Eqs. (3.18) and (3.13), (3.14). The protocol operates in
the region which is defined by the solid lines.
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3.1.2 Six-state protocol
The threshold disturbances for the six-state protocol can be determined in
the same way. In this case, however, all three bases are used with the same
probabilities and thus the average estimated disturbance (QBER) reads
D =
1
3
2∑
b=0
Tr
(j1)
A,B
{[
(T bA ⊗ T bB) P (T b†A ⊗ T b†B )
]
j1
ρ
(j1)
AB
}
(3.19)
where the unitary (but not hermitian) transformation T is defined in Eq. (2.6).
In analogy to the BB84 protocol, exploiting the symmetries underlying
Eq. (3.19) one finds that D is invariant under the transformations
(l, b) → (l ⊕2 1, b),
(l, b) → (l, b⊕3 1),
(l, b) → (l, b⊕3 2), (3.20)
with ⊕3 denoting addition modulo 3. Furthermore, the invariance of D under
the transformations (3.20) implies that the reduced density operators ρ
(j1)
AB
and
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
12
∑
g∈G1,t∈G3
U(t)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(t)† (3.21)
yield the same average QBER. This latter state is invariant under the discrete
Abelian groups G1 [with elements given in Eq. (3.6)] and G3 = {t1, t2, t3} with
elements
U(t1) = TA ⊗ TB,
U(t2) = T 2A ⊗ T 2B ,
U(t3) = 1A ⊗ 1B. (3.22)
The most general two-qubit state invariant under the Abelian groups G1 and
G3 is now of the form (3.8), with
λ00 = λ10 = λ01. (3.23)
Thus, in the computational basis ρ˜
(j1)
AB is given by (3.11) with
D = 2λ00, F = λ11 + λ00,
G = 0, H = λ00 − λ11. (3.24)
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Figure 3.2: Six-state protocol: Region of the parameters D(QBER) and H
for which the two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable (thick solid line). The various
constraints that these parameters satisfy are indicated by straight dotted
lines. Specifically, (a) Eq. (3.17); (b) Eq. (3.16); (c) Eqs. (3.13) and (3.25).
The protocol operates along the solid lines.
Accordingly, condition (3.14) now reads
F +H = D, (3.25)
while non-negativity of the eigenvalues λαβ implies inequality (3.16) only. Fi-
nally, applying the Peres-Horodecki criterion one finds that ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable
if and only if inequality (3.17) is satisfied.
As a consequence of Eqs. (3.13), (3.25) and G = 0, there is only one
macroscopic independent parameter in our problem, say H, while combining
inequalities (3.16) and (3.17) with Eqs. (3.13) and (3.25) one obtains that the
reduced density operator ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable iff 1/3 ≤ D ≤ 2/3 (Figure 3.2).
That is, no matter how powerful the eavesdropper is, Alice and Bob share
always provable entanglement for estimated disturbances smaller than 1/3.
The lowest disentanglement border for the six-state scheme (Dth = 1/3) is
attained for H = −1/3. It is also worth noting that, in contrast to BB84, in
the six-state protocol there is only one disentanglement threshold since for
D > 2/3 the protocol is not valid.
As expected, the bound for the six-state protocol is higher than the one
for the BB84 protocol. In fact, as a consequence of the high symmetry of
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the six-state protocol, the disentanglement area of the BB84 scheme (shaded
region in Figure 3.1) shrinks to a line in Figure 3.2 (thick line). As will be
seen later on, this “degeneracy” affects significantly the options of a potential
eavesdropper in the framework of the six-state protocol, increasing thus the
robustness of the protocol.
3.2 The price of disentanglement
In QKD issues, Eve’s attack is usually optimized by maximizing her Shannon
information (or the probability of her guessing correctly Alice’s bit-string)
conditioned on a fixed disturbance. Given, however, that the unconditional
security of the BB84 and six-state cryptographic schemes is beyond doubt,
Eve might be willing to reduce the robustness of the protocols to the lowest
possible level while simultaneously maximizing any of her properties [AGS03].
Thus, what remains to be clarified now is the cost at which Eve can saturate
the lowest disentanglement threshold Dth, in terms of her information gain
and probability of correct guessing. To this end, one has to consider in detail
the eavesdropping attack on the BB84 and the six-state protocols.
Such an investigation, however, is practically feasible only in the context
of attacks on a few qubits. As the number of attacked qubit-pairs increases
the complete treatment of the problem becomes intractable due to the large
number of independent parameters involved. In this section the focus is on
incoherent and two-qubit coherent attacks. The disentanglement of Alice
and Bob in the framework of incoherent attacks has been extensively studied
in the literature [GW99, GW00, AGS03, AMG03, Bru03]. In most of these
studies, however, Eve’s attack is by default optimized to provide her with
the maximal Shannon information. On the contrary, here all the flexibility is
given to Eve to adjust her parameters in order to break entanglement between
Alice and Bob and simultaneously maximize her properties. Finally, for the
two QKD protocols under consideration, there is no related previous work
on disentanglement in the context of coherent attacks.
3.2.1 Four-state protocol
Incoherent attacks
Incoherent attacks belong to the class of the so-called single-qubit or indi-
vidual attacks, where Eve manipulates each transmitted qubit individually.
To this end, she attaches a single probe (initially prepared in e.g. state |0E〉)
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to each transmitted qubit and lets the combined system undergo a unitary
transformation of the form [FG+97, GR+02, CG97]
|0B〉 ⊗ |0E〉 →
√
F |0B〉 ⊗ |φ0〉+
√
D |1B〉 ⊗ |θ0〉,
|1B〉 ⊗ |0E〉 →
√
F |1B〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+
√
D |0B〉 ⊗ |θ1〉, (3.26)
with F and D being the fidelity and disturbance respectively, while |φj〉 and
|θj〉 are normalized states of Eve’s probe when Bob receives the transmitted
qubit undisturbed (probability F ) and disturbed (probability D), respec-
tively. Applying unitarity and symmetry conditions on this transformation
one finds that the states |φj〉 are orthogonal to the states |θj〉 (j ∈ {0, 1}),
while the overlaps 〈φ0|φ1〉 and 〈θ0|θ1〉 are real-valued [FG+97, GR+02, CG97].
Thus, an incoherent attack can be described by the four parameters satis-
fying Eqs. (3.13), (3.14) (3.15) and (3.16) with H = −F 〈φ0|φ1〉 and G =
−D〈θ0|θ1〉. In other words, there are only two independent parameters and
by fixing one of them, say D, one is able to determine any property of the
attack. In Figs. 3.3, Eve’s optimal information gain and probability of suc-
cess in guessing the transmitted qubit correctly is given as functions of the
disturbance (solid line). The optimization is performed in the usual way, i.e.
for a fixed disturbance D, Eve’s mutual information with Alice is maximized
[FG+97, CG97]. It is also known that such an optimized strategy disentan-
gles the qubits of Alice and Bob at D(1) ≈ 30% (vertical dotted line)[GW99],
which is well above Dth = 25%. Thus, the natural question arises is whether,
under the assumption of incoherent attacks, Eve can saturate the lowest
possible disentanglement border Dth and if yes, at which cost of information
loss.
To answer this question, for a fixed disturbance D, all the possible values
of G and H which are consistent with the constraints (3.13)-(3.16) and which
yield a separable state of Alice and Bob are calculated numerically. In gen-
eral, at any given disturbance there is more than one combination of values
of G and H which fulfill all these constraints. For each of these combinations,
we calculated Eve’s information gain and her probability of correct guessing
[FG+97, CG97]. The results presented as squares in Figs. 3.3, refer to those
combinations of parameters which, not only disentangle the two honest par-
ties for a particular disturbance D, but which simultaneously maximize Eve’s
property as well. Clearly, for disturbances close to Dth, the two strategies
are not equivalent since they yield substantially different results. In other
words, an optimal incoherent attack that maximizes Eve’s information gain
is certainly not the one which achieves the lowest possible robustness bound.
Furthermore, our simulations show that saturation of Dth = 1/4 is feasible
at the cost of ∼ 4% less information gain of Eve or equivalently at the cost
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of ∼ 7.44% less probability of success in guessing.
Two-qubit coherent attacks
In a two-qubit coherent attack, Eve attaches one probe to two of the qubits
sent by Alice. Let |mB〉 with m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, be the message sent from Alice
to Bob in binary notation. The combined system then undergoes a unitary
transformation of the form [CG97]
|0B〉
|1B〉
|2B〉
|3B〉
⊗ |0E〉 → E ⊗

|0B〉
|1B〉
|2B〉
|3B〉
 , (3.27)
where E is a 4 × 4 matrix which contains normalized states in the Hilbert
space of Eve’s probe
E ≡

√
α |φ0〉
√
β |θ0〉
√
β |ω0〉 √γ |χ0〉√
β |θ1〉
√
α |φ1〉 √γ |χ1〉
√
β |ω1〉√
β |ω2〉 √γ |χ2〉
√
α |φ2〉
√
β |θ2〉√
γ |χ3〉
√
β |ω3〉
√
β |θ3〉
√
α |φ3〉
 .
The states φj, θj, ωj and χj denote Eve’s probe states in cases in which Bob
receives all the transmitted qubits undisturbed, one qubit disturbed or both
transmitted qubits disturbed.
Applying unitarity and symmetry conditions on Eq. (3.27), the problem
can be formulated in terms of the following four mutually orthogonal sub-
spaces [CG97]
Sφ = {φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3}, Sχ = {χ0, χ1, χ2, χ3},
Sθ = {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3}, Sω = {ω0, ω1, ω2, ω3},
while all the overlaps between the various states within each of these sub-
spaces are real-valued. Thus, Eve is able to infer with certainty whether Bob
has received both qubits undisturbed (Sφ), one qubit disturbed (Sθ,ω) or both
qubits disturbed (Sχ). These events occur with probabilities α, 2β and γ,
respectively. It can be shown that a general coherent two-qubit attack can
be described in terms of five independent parameters [CG97]. The average
reduced density matrix for Alice and Bob is then of the form (3.11), with F =
α+ β, D = β + γ, H = −(α〈φ0|φ1〉+ β〈θ0|θ2〉), G = −(γ〈χ0|χ1〉+ β〈θ0|θ1〉),
satisfying the constraints (3.13), (3.14), (3.15) and (3.16).
Compared to an incoherent attack, a two-qubit coherent attack can im-
prove the probability that Eve guesses correctly the whole two-bit message
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Figure 3.3: BB84 protocol — Incoherent attacks : (a) Eve’s probability of
guessing correctly the transmitted message as a function of disturbance D.
The solid line corresponds to an attack that maximizes Eve’s probability of
success in guessing, while each square denotes the corresponding probability
for an attack which in addition, disentangles Alice and Bob at the specific
disturbance. (b) As in (a) but for Eve’s information gain. The vertical dotted
lines correspond to the solid curves, and denote the disturbance D(1) ≈ 30%
up to which Alice and Bob share an entangled state. The vertical dashed lines
denote the lowest disentanglement threshold disturbance Dth = 1/4 which
can be attained in the context of general coherent attacks and intercept-
resend strategies.
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sent by Alice to Bob [CG97]. Eve’s optimal probability of success in guess-
ing is plotted in Figure 3.4 (solid line), as a function of disturbance D. This
curve has been obtained by maximizing Eve’s probability of success in guess-
ing conditioned on a fixed disturbance D. For such an optimal attack, it is
found numerically that Alice and Bob share entanglement up to disturbances
of the order of D(2) ≈ 28% (dotted vertical line). This is in contrast to the
bound D(1) ≈ 30% attained in an optimal incoherent attack. Furthermore,
it is also found that Eve is able to saturate the lowest possible robustness
bound (dashed vertical line), at the cost of ∼ 3% less probability of success
in guessing. This loss of Eve’s probability in guessing is substantially smaller
than the corresponding loss for incoherent attacks (∼ 7.44%). Thus, it could
be argued that a two-qubit coherent attack which is optimized with respect
to the probability of guessing only, is very close to an optimal coherent at-
tack which also disentangles Alice and Bob at Dth = 1/4. The reason is
basically that in a two-qubit coherent attack each one of the two indepen-
dent macroscopic parameters G and H can be expressed in terms of two
different overlaps whereas in incoherent attacks the corresponding depen-
dencies involve a single overlap only. In a coherent attack Eve has therefore
more possibilities enabling her to push the disentanglement border towards
the lowest possible value, while simultaneously maximizing her probability
of guessing correctly the transmitted message.
3.2.2 Six-state protocol
So far, incoherent and coherent attacks in the context of the BB84 protocol
are considered where Eve’s attack is determined by a set of two macroscopic
parameters (G,H). These two independent parameters give a considerable
flexibility to Eve since at a given disturbance there exists a variety of phys-
ically allowed attacks. This fact is also reflected in Figure 3.1 where, for a
specific disturbance, Alice and Bob can be disentangled for different values
of H (and therefore of G).
In the highly symmetric six-state protocol, however, the situation is much
simpler. In fact, the high symmetry of the protocol reduces significantly
the options of an eavesdropper since there is only one independent macro-
scopic parameter in our problem, namely H. Moreover, the analysis of the
attacks under consideration becomes rather straightforward [PG99]. In par-
ticular, for incoherent attacks G = −D〈θ0|θ1〉 = 0 which indicates that Eve
has full information about the disturbed qubits received by Bob. However,
as depicted in Figure 3.2, at a given value of D there is a unique value
of H consistent with the laws of quantum mechanics. It is determined by
Eqs. (3.13) and (3.25) [line (c) in Figure 3.2]. Similarly, for the two qubit
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Figure 3.4: BB84 protocol — Two-qubit coherent attacks : Eve’s proba-
bility of guessing correctly a two-bit transmitted message as a function of
disturbance D. The solid line corresponds to an attack that maximizes Eve’s
probability of success in guessing only, while each square denotes the corre-
sponding probability for an attack that, in addition, disentangles Alice and
Bob at the specified disturbance. The vertical dotted line corresponds to
the solid curve, and denotes the disturbance D(2) ≈ 28% up to which Al-
ice and Bob share an entangled state. The vertical dashed line denotes the
lowest possible disentanglement threshold disturbance Dth = 1/4 that can
be attained in the context of general coherent attacks and intercept-resend
strategies.
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coherent attack one has 〈χ0|χ1〉 = 〈θ0|θ1〉 = 0 and thus G = 0, whereas
H = −(α〈φ0|φ1〉+ β〈θ0|θ2〉) = −(α− γ) = 2D − 1. As a result, for both in-
coherent and two-qubit coherent attacks, the physically allowed attack is the
one that maximizes Eve’s probability of guessing and simultaneously disen-
tangles Alice and Bob at a given disturbance. It is sufficient for Eve therefore
to optimize her attack with respect to her probability of correct guessing in
order to disentangle Alice and Bob at the lowest possible disturbance.
3.3 Entanglement and intrinsic information
So far, the maximal disturbance up to which Alice and Bob share entan-
glement is discussed for both the four- and six-state protocols. Clearly, this
bound indicates that in principle secret-key generation is feasible by means of
a quantum purification protocol. In this section it is shown that, at least in
the context of incoherent attacks, a two-way classical protocol, the so-called
advantage distillation protocol, exists which can tolerate precisely the same
amount of disturbance as a quantum purification protocol.
To this end, Maurer’s model for classical key agreement by public dis-
cussion from common information [Mau93] is adopted. Briefly, in this clas-
sical scenario, Alice, Bob and Eve, have access to independent realizations
of random variables X, Y and Z, respectively, jointly distributed according
to PXY Z . Furthermore, the two honest parties are connected by a noiseless
and authentic (but otherwise insecure) channel. In the context of this model,
Maurer and Wolf have shown that a useful upper bound for the secret-key
rate S(X;Y ||Z) is the so called intrinsic information I(X;Y ↓ Z) which is
defined as
I(X;Y ↓ Z) = min
Z→Z¯
{I(X : Y |Z)},
where I(X : Y |Z) is the mutual information between the variables X and
Y conditioned on Eve’s variable Z, while the minimization runs over all the
possible maps Z → Z¯ [MW99].
For the current purposes, one can link this classical scenario to a quantum
one. More precisely, the joint distribution PXY Z can be thought of as arising
from measurements performed on a quantum state |ΨABE〉 shared between
Alice, Bob and Eve. One has to, however, focus on incoherent attacks where
Eve interacts individually with each qubit and performs any measurements
before reconciliation. Thus, at the end of such an attack the three parties
share independent realizations of the random variables X, Y and Z. Accord-
ingly, the resulting mixed state after tracing out Eve’s degrees of freedom
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is of the form (3.11) where H = −F 〈φ0|φ1〉 and G = −D〈θ0|θ1〉. It turns
out [GW00] that the random variables X and Y are symmetric bits whose
probability of being different is given by Prob[X 6= Y ] = D whereas Eve’s
random variable consists of two bits Z1 and Z2. The first bit Z1 = X ⊕2 Z
shows whether Bob has received the transmitted qubit disturbed (Z1 = 1)
or undisturbed (Z1 = 0). The probability that the second bit Z2 indicates
correctly the value of the bit Y is given by
Prob[Z2 = Y ] = δ =
1 +
√
1− 〈φ0|φ1〉2
2
. (3.28)
As has been shown by Gisin and Wolf [GW00], for the scenario under con-
sideration secret key agreement is always possible iff the following condition
holds
D
1−D < 2
√
(1− δ)δ. (3.29)
More precisely, one can show that if the above condition is not satisfied,
the intrinsic information vanishes whereas, in any other case there exists a
classical protocol that can provide Alice and Bob with identical keys about
which Eve has negligible information. Such a protocol, for instance is the so-
called advantage distillation protocol which is described in detail elsewhere
[Mau93].
In our case now, considering that Eve has adjusted the parameters in
her attack to disentangle Alice and Bob at the lowest possible disturbance,
Eq. (3.28) yields for the two protocols
δ =
{
3+2
√
2
6
BB84 protocol
2+
√
3
4
six-state protocol.
Using these values of δ in Eq. (3.29) one then obtains bounds that are pre-
cisely the same with the threshold disturbances for provable entanglement
derived in Section 3.2.1. In other words it is shown that, as long as Alice and
Bob are entangled, a classical advantage distillation protocol is capable of
providing them with a secret key, provided Eve restricts herself to individual
attacks only (see also [AMG03, Bru03] for similar results).
This result is a manifestation of the link between quantum and secret
correlations in both four- and six-state QKD protocols [CLL03, AG05]. For
the time being, the validity of this equivalence between classical and quantum
distillation protocols is restricted to individual attacks only. Investigations of
tomographic QKD protocols have shown, however, that such an equivalence
is invalid for coherent attacks.
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Chapter 4
Practical Quantum Key
Distribution
The discussion on achievable key generation rates and the bounds on per-
formance of quantum key distribution protocols so far has assumed perfect
source, quantum channel and detectors. With the present day available tech-
nology, neither of them are perfect. The source generally produces quantum
signals in the form of weak coherent pulses which have a finite probability
of having multiphoton pulses. An eavesdropper can take advantage of this
lack of single photon pulses and she can imply more dangerous attacks. The
channel connecting Alice and Bob is lossy. Eve can replace this with a perfect
one and can even better her attack. The detector efficiency is less than unity
and the detector has a finite probability of dark counts. These dark counts
limit the distance up to which secure key can be transmitted.
In this chapter tagging attack is studied in detail. This attack has already
been studied in various papers [GL+00, FG+01]. All this work has so far
concentrated on one-way classical communication for post processing. It has
been shown in [FG+01] that sudden dip in key generation rate is indeed
because of dark counts. Here two-way classical communication is used to
postpone disastrous effects of dark counts to a considerable distance without
much loss of key rate. This attack is studied in non-trusted-device scenario.
In Sec. 4.1 practical limitations are discussed in detail. These limitations
are general for all protocols. For the illustration of our results a specific model
is then adopted and presented which consists of specific form of imperfections
and source, detector and channel. It is then described how Eve can take
advantage of these imperfections and employ tagging attack. In Sec. 4.2 the
key generation rates using one-way classical communication are reviewed.
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One-way classical communication is indeed limited both in key generation
rate and distances. This limitation is obvious both for four- and six-state
protocols. Further in Sec. 4.3, a way is devised to increase this distance and
rate by using two-way classical communication for post processing. First the
whole tagging attack scenario is visualized in entanglement-based picture.
This allows further to visualize Alice and Bob’s quantum states. The error
rejection based on two-way classical communication then allows different
pairing of tagged and untagged pairs. The numerical simulations for key
generation rates are presented for four-state, six-state and corresponding
decoy state protocols at the end of section.
4.1 Practical limitations and their fatalities
in QKD
While considering practical limitations, it is pessimistically assumed that
Eve has limitless power and she is restricted only by laws of physics. Alice
and Bob are considered to have the present day technology only. With these
limitations Eve can take advantage of Alice and Bob’s faulty apparatus.
There are three main factors in practical QKD: (i) Alice’s source (ii) Channel
connecting Alice and Bob and (iii) Bob’s detector.
Optical quantum cryptography relies on the use of single photon sources.
Such sources are practically difficult to realize. The present available sources
use faint laser pulses, entangled photon pairs, photon pairs by parametric
down conversion and photon guns. Both faint laser pulses and entangled
photons generate photons which obey poissonian photon distribution. This
means that both have a small probability of generating more than one photon.
Even small fractions of these multiphoton pulses can have important effects
on security, as will be discussed later. For weak laser pulses mean photon
number must be chosen carefully. If mean photon number is too small most
of the pulses are empty and detector’s dark counts become effective. Mostly
a mean photon number of 0.1 is used but more precisely an optimal mean
photon based on transmission losses can be used. Although these states
produce a key which is as secure as a single photon state but the bit rate is
too low.
The problem of empty pulses is solved by the photon pairs generated by
parametric down conversion. Here one photon is used as a trigger for the
generation of other. Here a second detector triggers only when first detector
has already detected a photon, hence mean photon number is 1. This way
problem of empty pulses is circumvented. The photon pairs generated in
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this method can be used as entangled pairs. If two photon pairs are emitted
within the same time window but their basis are chosen totally independently,
they produce totally uncorrelated results. These entangled pairs can be used
in entanglement based cryptography or where their entanglement can be
exploited. This way problem of multiphoton pulses can be avoided.
The ideal single photon device is a photon gun. Its a device which when a
trigger is pulled, then and only then emits only one single photon. However
presently available guns are far from ideal. At present there are three different
methods to make a single photon gun. The first idea consists of using a two
level atom. The available systems are single trapped atoms or ions but
they require a lot technical effort. Single organic dye molecules are easier to
handle but they have a problem of limited stability at room temperature. A
good option is nitrogen-vacancy center in diamond. It is possible to excite
individual nitrogen atoms with a 532-nm laser beam, which will subsequently
emit a florescent beam of 700 nm. The florescence exhibits strong photon anti
bunching and is stable at room temperature. However collection efficiency of
such a gun is too low, currently around 0.1. In addition bandwidth of such a
source is broad, currently of the order of 100 nm, which can enhance the effect
of perturbations in quantum channel. The second idea is to generate photons
by single electrons in a mesoscopic p-n junction. The idea is based on idea
presented by Imamglo and Yamamoto is based on Pauli exclusion principle
that thermal electrons show antibunching. The experimental demonstrations
have shown very low efficiency and at very low temperatures of only 50 mK.
Another method of generating photons in photon guns is by photon emission
in an electron-hole pairs in a semiconductor quantum dot. The frequency of
the photons depends on the number of such electron hole pairs. Once a large
number of such electron hole pairs are generated by optical pumping, they
recombine to emit photons at different frequencies. Hence a single photon
pulse is generated by spectral filtering. These dots can be integrated in solid
state micro cavities but it then enhances spontaneous emission Thus photon
guns are technically too complicated. In addition due to their low quantum
efficiencies they practically offer no advantage over faint laser pulses with low
mean photon number.
The single photons are carried to their detectors by quantum channels.
The channels are called quantum because they are intended to carry informa-
tion encoded in individual quantum signals. Here the term individual means
that unlike classical systems where many photons carry the same informa-
tion, information is encoded only once on quantum carriers.
Alice’s source can have many limitations. There may be misalignment,
polarization diffusion, fringe visibility and most importantly lack of single
photon pulses. All optical quantum cryptography is based on single photon
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Fock states. The source in general emits signal which follow poissonian dis-
tribution. Thus there is a finite probability of having more than one photon.
Though Eve is not allowed to enter Alice’s office but the channel connecting
Alice and Bob is open to her. She can detach a photon from multiphoton
while passing through the channel without disturbing the polarization of the
photon. Thus she is able to do quantum non-demolition measurement. Lossy
channel allows Eve to further take advantage of multiphotons. She can, in
principle replace the channel with a lossless one and stop some of the single
photon pulses. This way she increases the percentage of multiphotons in the
final key. Since she keeps the expected click rate at Bob’s detector the same,
she remains undetected.
4.1.1 A model for imperfections
As stated earlier there are three main imperfections in the typical QKD
implementation, the source, the channel and the detector. A model based on
such imperfections has been thoroughly discussed in the literature [GR+02,
Lut00, BL+00, FG+01].
In our case the model for source, channel and detector is taken as follows.
Source as weak attenuated laser pulse
Consider an imperfect source which with probability ptag produces tagged
qubits (signals).The tagged qubits are the ones from which Eve is capable of
extracting the information that which random basis Alice used before their
submission to Bob. Thus Eve is able to measure each one of these qubits in
such a way that she can unambiguously determine its quantum state with-
out disturbing the polarization state. This way she does not introduce any
detectable errors. The remaining untagged signals are produced by Alice’s
source with probability 1− ptag. These signals do not reveal full information
to Eve and any intervention by Eve eventually introduces errors. Hence the
overall bit error rate estimated by Alice and Bob during verification stage is
due to untagged signals only. Here classical random sampling can be safely
applied for the estimation of error rates and the establishment of related
confidence levels during the verification test [LCA05]. Thus one can assume
that the actual bit error rate in the pairs shared between Alice and Bob is
the same as estimated by them in test pairs. The error rate is hence given
as δ = (1 − ptag)δb,u, where δb,u is the probability with which an untagged
qubit pair contributes to the overall bit error rate. Since there is symmetry
between all the bases used in the QKD protocols under consideration, the
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expected corresponding phase error probability, δp,u, is the same as bit error
one, i.e. δp,u = δb,u and δp,u = δ/(1− ptag)
A practically relevant special case of tagging is the signal sources currently
used in various realistic set ups, which produce polarized phase randomized
weak coherent pulses (WCPs) [GR+02, Lut00, BL+00, FG+01]. Both faint
laser pulses and entangled photon pairs produce such pulses. The photon
number distribution pi (i = 0, 1, ...) is Poissonian in this case, i.e. pi =
exp(−µ)µi/i!, where µ denotes the mean photon number in the pulse. Alice
encodes each of her random bit in a WCP and sends it to Bob. However, as is
apparent from the distribution, in addition to single photon pulses there is a
finite probability of pulses which contain more than one photon. Thus such a
source deviates from ideal single photon source. The probability of having a
single photon pulses is p1 and that of multiphoton ones is ptag = 1− p0− p1.
As will be discussed later, Eve can obtain full information on all the bits
encoded in multiphoton pulses by means of photon number splitting (PNS)
attack. Thus for such a source multiphoton pulses are viewed as tagged and
the single photon ones as untagged. Typically in WCP-based QKD protocols
µ is chosen sufficiently small so that the source imitates a single photon source
as closely as possible [GR+02]. This µ however cannot be taken too small
because then dark counts of the detector become prominent. Thus µ has to
be optimized for fixed distance [Lut00].
Imperfect quantum channels
In addition to imperfect signal sources, realistic set ups involve imperfect
quantum channels and detectors. As a result the raw key rate Pexp is less
than unity. Pexp is the probability of a single photon detection event to occur
at Bob’s site and sometimes referred as expected click probability. Some of
the signals are lost in the lossy channel. The final click probability involves
contributions both from real signals arriving at Bob’s detector and from
dark counts. In the adopted model, the probability for the former is given as
P signalexp = 1 − exp(−µηcηdet), where ηc denotes the transmission efficiency of
the channel and ηdet is the detection efficiency of Bob’s detector. The mean
photon number in the P signalexp is thus reduced by factor ηcηdet. For QKD
implementations at telecommunication wavelengths, ηdet 0.1 − 0.2 and for
quantum channels comprising of optical fibres
ηc = 10
−(αl+Lc)/10. (4.1)
Thereby, α denotes a polarization independent loss coefficient of the fibre, l
is the length of the fiber, and Lc denotes the distance independent loss of the
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channel.
Threshold detectors
The detectors available with present day technology are the threshold detec-
tors. They give a click when an non-empty pulse arrives and do not click
for an empty or vacuum pulse. The detectors hence cannot differentiate be-
tween single and multiphoton pulses. In addition the detector sometimes
clicks even when there is no signal which results in dark counts. Though this
dark count probability is very less pdarkexp v 2 × 10−4 − 10−6 but it becomes
effective at large distances when the actual signal probability becomes less
as mentioned in Sec. (2.2.1). In this chapter two experimental setups are
used, one from KTH stockholm [BG+99] and other called as GYS [GYS04],
where author’s name form the acronym. Both use avalanche photo diode
(APD’s), InGAs detectors for a signal with wavelength 1550nm. In KTH
parameters the both the dark count probability, pdarkexp v 2× 10−4, and detec-
tion efficiency, ηdet v 0.18, are high. GYS have used very low temperatures
( -100C) which has enabled them to reduce dark counts to pdarkexp v 2× 10−6
but it makes detection efficiency quite low, ηdet v 0.045. The effect on key
generation rates can be seen in the coming sections.
Including above mentioned imperfections in source, channel and detec-
tors, typically Pexp is given as [GR
+02, Lut00, BL+00, FG+01]
Pexp = P
signal
exp + (1− P signalexp )P darkexp = 1− e−µηcηdet + e−µηcηdetP darkexp . (4.2)
For an ideal link involving a lossless channel and ideal detector, Pexp =
1− e−µ.
The overall bit-error rate in the sifted key has also two contributions and
is modeled by [GR+02, Lut00, BL+00, FG+01]
δ = δopt + δdet =
δ0 P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
Pexp
. (4.3)
The first contribution is a measure of optical quality of the whole setup.
In particular, the constant δ0 accounts for possible alignment errors, polar-
ization diffusion or fringe visibility The second contribution δdet, originates
from dark counts at Bob’s detectors. A factor of 1/2 indicates that in half
such cases Bob’s random measurement result would be differing from Alice.
Hence, an error will be generated in half of the cases only. In the most
pessimistic scenario usually adopted in security proofs, all the error rate δ
is attributed to Eve. This pessimistic approach is the so called non-trusted
device scenario.
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Finally, any imperfections, losses, and noise significantly affect the frac-
tion of tagged qubits arriving at Bob’s site. In general, the new (effective)
tagging probability ∆, can be expressed in terms of the parameters charac-
terizing the channel, the source and the detectors. An upper bound on ∆,
for example, may be obtained by the following consideration, in the case of
a photon source emitting phase-averaged WCPs [Lut00, BL+00]. An eaves-
dropper, Eve, with unlimited power may not only obtain perfect information
about all the classical bits originating from multiphoton pulses but she may
also increase the fraction of these multiphoton pulses as much as possible
without affecting Bob’s expected click-rate probability. For this purpose she
can replace the lossy quantum channel by a perfect one (i.e., ηc = 1) so that
all multiphoton pulses are transmitted perfectly. In order to keep Pexp con-
stant she has to block an appropriate number of single-photon pulses. Thus,
the maximum probability of tagged pulses arriving at Bob’s detector, which
Eve can have perfect knowledge about, is given by [Lut00, BL+00]
∆ ≈ 1− (1 + µ) exp (−µ)
Pexp
, (4.4)
while the corresponding probability for single-photon pulses is given by (1−
∆), so that they sum up to unity.
4.2 Limitations of one-way post processing
Knowing the experimental setup it is now of interest to see the achievable
rates and distances using one-way classical communication. As stated in
Sec. 2.3.2, Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) have derived
security of BB84 protocol in realistic scenario of tagging attack using one-way
classical communication [GL+00]. The tagging attack is referred to as a weak
basis dependent attack, that is where Eve already knows the basis of some
of the signals, that is the tagged ones. They have shown that tagging does
not make the key insecure, rather it only effects the key generation rates and
distance up to which key is secure. For one-way CSS based post-processing
the asymptotic rate is given as
RCSS =
Pexp
β
[1−∆−H(δ)− (1−∆)H (δp,u)] . (4.5)
Here H(x) := −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary shannon entropy.
For the analysis of the key generation rates, GLLP have considered the most
pessimistic scenario. It is called the non trusted device scenario. In this
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scenario all errors including dark counts are attributed to Eve. Eve is in fact
allowed to take advantage of dark counts as well. In addition she increases
the percentage of tagged pulses in the ones reaching Bob by replacing the
lossy channel by a perfect one. Thus the estimated bit error rate δ in equation
(4.5) is coming only from untagged pulses and is given as δ = (1 − ∆)δb,u.
The phase error correction also includes all the errors in equation (4.3) and
is given as
δp,u = δ/(1−∆) (4.6)
The expected click rate or the raw key rate Pexp is given by equation (4.2).
The factor 1/β accounts for the fraction of raw bits thrown away during
sifting process. Clearly for the four-state protocol β = 2 (two basis) and
for six-state protocol (three basis) β = 3. In addition through out this
work the correlations between bit flip and phase flip errors have not been
considered. Such a consideration can increase the rate of six-state protocol
but considering worst case scenario of no correlation, one can stick to the
rate given by equation (4.5) for both protocols.
Using the analysis of GLLP, the typical key generation rate as a function
of distance (i.e. the length l of the fiber) for BB84 and six-state protocol is
given in Figure 4.1. The rate is given on logarithmic scale which shows a
linear decrease before a cut off at about 25km is reached. This cut off is due
to the presence of dark counts. The contribution to the error rate by actual
signal pulses decreases as the length of fiber increases. As a result at a certain
distance (25 km in this case), dark counts become the main contributor to
error rate. Almost all the key is hence lost during error correction and privacy
amplification. This point is clear by the dotted line which shows the key rate
for four-state protocol in the absence of dark counts. It may be noted that
both four- and six-state show the cut off at the same distance. However it
can be increased for six-state protocol if correlations between bit and phase
errors are taken into account.
The maximally tolerable error rates limit the distance up to which a
secure key can be generated. Since Eve has full information about tagged
pulses, its the error rate on untagged pulses which limits this distance. It has
been shown in Chapter 3 that provable entanglement is necessary criteria for
extraction of secure key. Thus if Alice and Bob can ensure the presence of
such correlations in the untagged part of the key, they can ensure security.
This is possible only if the corresponding error rate δ/(1−∆) does not exceed
1/4 for the four-state and 1/3 for the six-state protocol i.e.
δ
1−∆ <
β − 1
2β
, for β ∈ {2, 3}. (4.7)
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Figure 4.1: Achievable secret-key rates as given by equation (4.5), for non-
ideal implementations of the four-state (full curve) and the six-state (dot-
dashed curve) QKD protocols: Error correction and privacy amplification
are performed by means of asymmetric CSS codes which involve one-way
classical communication only. The vertical lines indicate the maximum al-
lowed distances for secret-key generation as determined by equation (4.7) for
the four-state (solid line at ∼ 42 km ) and the six-state protocol (dot-dashed
line at ∼ 50 km). Also shown is the secret-key rate of the four-state protocol
in the absence of dark counts (dotted curve). All relevant parameters are
chosen as in the experiment of Ref. [BG+99] i.e., α = 0.2dB/km, Lc = 1dB,
δ0 = 1%, P
dark
exp = 2 × 10−4, and ηdet = 0.18.The mean photon number µ is
optimized at each distance so that the key generation rate is maximum
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This is the generalized form of the necessary condition given in Chapter 3,
in the absence of tagging. Indeed the intercept-resend attack by Eve can
always break entanglement between Alice and Bob at an error rate δ ≥
(1−∆)(β − 1)/2β.
Since both δ and ∆ depend on length of the fiber, equation (4.7) limits
the distance up to which secure key can be distilled. These distances are
given by solid vertical lines for four-state and dotted vertical line for six-state
protocol. Indeed the distance actually reached by one-way post processing is
much less than this achievable distance. There is a gap of around 15 km for
four-state protocol and that of 25 km for six-state protocol, between achieved
and allowed distances. In the following sections it is shown how this gap can
be decreased by using two-way post processing.
4.3 Practical QKD with two-way classical com-
munication
Knowing the limited distance achieved by one-way post processing, an at-
tempt is made to increase this distance. It has been found in Ref. [KNA06]
that the upper bound on achievable distances can be reached if two-way post
processing is used prior to the one-way. Two-way post processing involves
error rejection by applying bilateral XOR gate on qubit pairs. This pro-
cess reduces the error rates and positive rate is then achieved by applying
CSS based post processing which is considered above. In order to see the
effect of two-way post processing, a quantum approach is used in which the
entanglement-based version of the four- and the six-state protocols are to be
considered. This requires the derivation of reduced quantum state of Alice
and Bob just before the post processing. For the purpose it is important to
consider the effect of Eve’s attack on Alice and Bob’s system. In the non
trusted device scenario all dark counts and channel losses will be given to
Eve.
4.3.1 An Optimal Eavesdropping strategy
Tagging attack has already been discussed at the end of Sec. 4.1.1 where
tagged qubits arrive at Bob’s detector with probability ∆. Let N be the
total number of qubits shared between Alice and Bob then for a fairly large
sample (i.e. large value of N) it is expected that Nu ≈ (1 −∆)N pairs are
untagged and Nt ≈ ∆N are tagged pairs.
In an optimal attack by Eve, in this work no correlations between tagged
and untagged signals are considered. As stated earlier Eve’s aim is to max-
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imize her information about Alice’s and Bob’s qubit pairs. She attains all
information about tagged ones, then she attacks the remaining untagged ones
separately. Each tagged qubit pair is also dealt separately. Nevertheless it
seems an optimal strategy by Eve as she doesn’t introduce any errors on the
tagged ones and on untagged ones she applies any joint coherent attack. The
coherent attack however introduces bit flip errors. Any attempt to jointly
attack the tagged and untagged ones will increase the errors introduced by
Eve. Keeping this in view the reduced state of Alice and Bob can be derived
separately for tagged and untagged bits.
Attack on tagged qubits
Attack on tagged qubits can be divided into two parts. First Eve applies
quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to measure the photon num-
ber in each pulse. This way she is able to separate the multiphoton (tagged)
pulses from the single photon (untagged) ones. This attack does not disturb
the polarization of the photon. On multiphoton pulses she then attaches a
probe to split one photon from each pulse without disturbing polarization.
Such an attack can be described by Jaynes-Cummings Hamiltonian, where
first Eve let a three level atom interact with the pulse coming from Bob.
With known ’n’ and fixed interaction time the atom exists in the one of the
two polarization excited modes and an n photon pulse is left with one photon
less. Eve then couples this atom to a field of her own which is in vacuum
mode and adjusting the interaction time, her atom is left in ground state and
field in polarization mode of Alice and Bob. In this way she is able to detach
a photon and remains maximally entangled to Alice and Bob [Lut00].
Now in order to determine the reduced state of Alice and Bob for all
tagged pairs, ρ
(Nt)
t , it is to be kept in mind that Eve attacks each pair sepa-
rately. Hence the reduced state is left as a product state i.e. ρ
(Nt)
t ≈ σ⊗Nt . It
is thus sufficient to consider one of these qubit pairs. In entanglement based
version after the distribution stage Alice announces which rotation I or H
she has applied. Bob as well as Eve undo the rotation. The combined state
of Alice, Bob and Eve in view of above mentioned photon splitting attack is
given as
|χ〉ABE = 1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B ⊗ |0˜〉E + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B ⊗ |1˜〉E)
≡ 1√
2
(|Φ+〉 ⊗ |0〉E + |Φ−〉 ⊗ |1〉E) . (4.8)
Thereby, Eve’s pure ancilla states |0〉E =
(|0˜〉E + |1˜〉E) /√2 and |1〉E =(|0˜〉E − |1˜〉E) /√2 are orthogonal. The Bell state |Φ−〉 = (|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B −
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|1〉A ⊗ |1〉B)/
√
2 characterizes the phase errors introduced by Eve’s ideal at-
tack. The equal amplitudes of magnitude 1/
√
2 reflect the fact that Eve
does not perturb Alice’s and Bob’s measurement statistics by her attack.
Correspondingly, the reduced quantum state of Alice and Bob resulting from
such an ideal attack is a random mixture of the ideal Bell state |Φ+〉 and the
corresponding phase-flipped Bell state |Φ−〉, i.e.,
σ =
1
2
(|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|). (4.9)
The separability of above state reflects the fact that Eve has a perfect copy
of Bob’s qubit and thus secret-key distillation is impossible [NKA06, CLL03,
AG05].
Attack on untagged qubits
As discussed earlier, Eve is able to do any coherent attack on the untagged
signals. In general the state obtained is a very complex state where the qubit
pairs are not only entangled among themselves but also with Eve. Such a
complex state is very difficult to analyze. However Alice and Bob apply
a random permutation on all qubit pairs just after reception of qubits by
Bob. If an entanglement purification protocol is applied in such a way that
it commutes with Bell measurement then it has been proved in [GL03] that
any coherent attack can be reduced to a Pauli attack and an uncorrelated
Pauli attack gives the same fidelity as a correlated one. Since the final fidelity
is the focus of interest, it is enough to consider the Pauli attack on a single
qubit pair. A pauli attack applies operator X with probability qx, Z with
probability qz and Y with probability qy. The state which results from an
uncorrelated Pauli attack is the tensor product of individual qubit pair state
i.e. ρ
(Nu)
u = τ⊗Nu and is a Bell diagonal state given as
τ = qI|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ qz|Φ−〉〈Φ−|
+ qx|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ qy|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|. (4.10)
The above state is rotation invariant under {I,H} which puts an additional
constraint on τ that qx = qz for four-state protocol. For six-state protocol
the state is invariant under {I, T , T 2} which puts an additional constraint
that qx = qy = qz.
Alice and Bob’s point of view
It is assumed that Alice and Bob are not having Eve’s technology. They
only have threshold detectors which cannot distinguish between a single and
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a multiphoton pulse. Thus they are unable to site the exact location of
tagged and untagged pulses. As a result all qubit pairs appear identical to
them. They just know that fraction ∆ are tagged and 1 −∆ are untagged.
Formally speaking, Alice and Bob share N qubit-pairs in the quantum state
ρ
(N)
tot =
1
Π
∑
Π
Π
(
σ⊗Nt ⊗ τ⊗Nu)Π†, (4.11)
where Ntand Nu are the number of tagged and untagged pairs respectively.
The summation runs over all possible permutations and expresses Alice’s
and Bob’s ignorance about the precise location of the tagged pairs within
the block of N pairs. In the limit of large N , Nu ≈ (1−∆)N and Nt ≈ ∆N ,
thus for Alice and Bob all pairs are in identical state ρ given as
ρ
(N)
tot ≈ ρ⊗N , (4.12)
where
ρ = ∆σ + (1−∆)τ. (4.13)
Now in order to estimate the bit error rate, Alice and Bob randomly sample
their pairs and measure them along a common Z-basis. They then announce
their result and determine in which cases the results differ. The overall bit
error probability determined this way is given as
δ = (1−∆)δb,u = (1−∆)(qx + qy) (4.14)
Here δb,u is the error probability for a single untagged pair and is determined
by state τ .
4.3.2 Error rejection using two-way post processing
Having got the states for both tagged and untagged qubit pairs, one can
apply the error rejection process to enhance the distance. For the purpose
the two-way post processing is used. This two-way post processing is based
on B-steps of Gottesman-Lo type [GL03, Ch02]. In the preceding work all
the qubit pairs are taken to be identical. In the present scenario the pairs are
no longer attacked the same way. Therefore one has to take into account the
influence of B-steps on tagged and untagged pairs. The tagging probability
changes with each B-step.
In a B-step Alice and Bob first pair up their EPR pairs i.e. they form
tetrad of their qubit pairs. Within each tetrad they then apply a bilateral
exclusive-OR operation (BXOR) operation. This operation is given as local
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unitary operation XORa→b : |x〉a ⊗ |y〉b 7→ |x〉a ⊗ |x⊕ y〉b, on their halves.
Thereby, ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2 while a and b denote the control and
target qubit, respectively. Accordingly, for the two qubit-pairs constituting
the random tetrad it gives the following map in the Bell basis
BXORa→b : |Ψ(a)i,j 〉 ⊗ |Ψ(b)x,y〉 7→ |Ψ(a)i,j⊕y〉 ⊗ |Ψ(b)i⊕x,y〉, (4.15)
where i, j, x, y ∈ {0, 1} and the Bell states are denoted by |Ψ0,0〉 ≡ |Φ+〉,
|Ψ0,1〉 ≡ |Φ−〉, |Ψ1,0〉 ≡ |Ψ+〉, and |Ψ1,1〉 ≡ |Ψ−〉. Subsequently, Alice
and Bob measure their target qubits (b) in the Z-basis and compare their
outcomes. The target pair is always discarded while the control qubit-pair is
kept if and only if their outcomes agree i.e., if and only if i = x. In general,
this procedure is repeated many times (many rounds of B-step).
Alice and Bob now apply the above mentioned operation on their pairs.
There are four different combinations in which qubit pairs can be paired up.
A tagged control pair can pair up with tagged target pair as well as with
untagged target pair. Vice versa an untagged control pair may pair up with
both tagged and untagged target pairs, yielding different states. We will see
that whenever an untagged pair is paired with a tagged one, the resulting
state is a tagged pair as described below
Untagged target pairing up with Untagged control pair
For such a pairing both target and control pairs are in state given by equation
(4.10). The probability for such pairing is (1−∆)2 as is evident from equation
(4.13). The control pair is kept only if Alice and Bob’s measurements agree.
The BXOR operation maps the control pair to a renormalized Bell diagonal
state given as [GL03]
q′I =
(qI + qz)
2 + (qI − qz)2
2Qu,s
,
q′z =
(qI + qz)
2 − (qI − qz)2
2Qu,s
,
q′x =
(qx + qy)
2 + (qx − qy)2
2Qu,s
,
q′y =
(qx + qy)
2 − (qx − qy)2
2Qu,s
, (4.16)
where Qu,s = (qI + qz)
2 + (qx + qy)
2 is the probability with which the control
qubit-pair is kept. Moreover, conservation of probability requires the relation
qI + qz + qx + qy = q
′
I + q
′
z + q
′
x + q
′
y = 1.
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Tagged target pairing up with tagged control pair
In view of equations (4.12-4.13) such a pairing takes place with probability
∆2. The two pairs are in the same Bell-diagonal state given by equation
(4.9), and thus the map (4.16) applies also in this case. Setting qx = qy = 0
and qI = qz = 1/2, one has that the control pair always survives and is again
tagged i.e., its state is given by (4.9).
Tagged target pairing up with untagged control pair
Such a pairing occurs with probability ∆(1 − ∆). Using the map (4.15)
and the form of the states τ and σ given by equations (4.10) and (4.9)
respectively, one immediately obtains that for the case under consideration
the control pair survives with probability Qt,s = (qI + qz) and is left in a
quantum state of the form (4.9). Knowing that one of the purifications of
such a state is equation (4.8), and giving all the purification to Eve [NC00],
one may conclude that the state of the surviving control pair refers to the
tagged state of equation (4.8). In other words, the initially untagged control
pair becomes tagged when paired with a tagged target pair. This is equivalent
to the XOR operation of an unknown classical bit S with a totally known
classical bit M . Since the target bit T = S ⊕M is announced publically, S
becomes perfectly known to Eve.
Untagged target pairing up with tagged control pairs
This is equivalent to previous case.
Thus an untagged pair when pairs up with tagged ones gets tagged. The
only case in which it results in an untagged pair is the one in which both
target and control pairs are untagged. The fraction of tagged pairs goes on
increasing with each B-step.
The survival probability for a qubit pair in the mixed quantum state of
equation (4.13) with σ and τ given by equations (4.9) and (4.10) respectively,
is given as
P ′s = (1−∆)2Qu,s + 2∆(1−∆)Qt,s +∆2. (4.17)
Moreover, its new quantum state is given by
ρ′ = ∆′σ + (1−∆′)τ ′, (4.18)
with the renormalized tagging probability
∆′ =
[∆2 + 2∆(1−∆)(qI + qz)]
P ′s
, (4.19)
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and with the untagged renormalized quantum state
τ ′ = q′I|Φ+〉〈Φ+|+ q′z|Φ−〉〈Φ−|
+ q′x|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ q′y|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| (4.20)
where the new probabilities (q′I, q
′
z, q
′
y, q
′
z) are determined by equations (4.16).
Correspondingly, the bit-error probability of this new quantum state is given
by
δ′ = (1−∆′)δ′b,u = (1−∆′)(q′x + q′y). (4.21)
As a result of the B-step, however, the probabilities of bit and phase errors
for an untagged qubit are not equal anymore. In particular, one has
δ′p,u = (q
′
z + q
′
y). (4.22)
Consider now that immediately after one such B-step Alice and Bob
switch to a one-way CSS-like EPP to distill a secret key. The overall asymp-
totically achievable secret-key generation rate is given by the corresponding
modification of equation (4.5) i.e.,
RBCSS =
PexpP
′
s
2β
(
1−∆′ −H(δ′)− (1−∆′)H(δ′p,u)
)
,
(4.23)
where ∆′, δ′ and δ′p,u are given by equations (4.17-4.22). The additional factor
of 1/2 accounts for the target qubit-pairs which are always thrown away
during the B-step. With the help of the recursion relations 4.16 and 4.19
asymptotically achievable secret-key generation rates can also be determined
for cases in which B-steps are applied iteratively before the final use of the
one-way CSS-like EPP. In that case, however, the factor of 1/2 should be
replaced by 1/2n, for n B-steps. The rate RBCSS is therefore a generalization
of the GLLP rate RCSS to a post-processing where the one-way CSS-like EPP
is initialized by a number of B-steps. Indeed, the rate 4.23 directly reduces
to the rate 4.5 in the absence of B-steps i.e., by setting (q′I, q
′
x, q
′
y, q
′
z) =
(qI, qx, qy, qz), P
′
s = 1, ∆
′ = ∆, and dropping the factor 1/2.
4.3.3 Numerical simulations and discussion
In order to examine the effect of two-way post processing on key generation
rates numerical simulations are performed. As stated above an eavesdropper
is assumed to have unlimited technological powers. She can replace the lossy
channel by a lossless one. In addition all the errors including dark counts are
attributed to Eve. She can take advantage of these errors by adjusting them
to her benefit.
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Initial values for error rates q′s
In order to start numerical simulations the initial values for the error rates
given in 4.16 are required. At the start of the EPP protocol the bit error
rate is obtained by combining Eqs. 4.3 and 4.14 and is given as
δ = (1−∆)(qx + qy) =
δ0P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
Pexp
(4.24)
where Pexp, P
signal
exp and ∆ are given before. In order to enter the map 4.16
for B steps, one needs to know the quantities qx, qy,qz and qI explicitly. This
can be obtained by taking into account various other constraints. The state
4.10 being a physical state must be normalized. The normalization condition
reads
qI = 1− qx − qy − qz. (4.25)
In addition there is symmetry between all the bases used in the QKD pro-
tocols. In four-state protocol, the state must remain invariant under the
transformation {I,H} Hence one other constraint reads
qx = qz (4.26)
Six-state protocol requires the invariance under {I, T , T 2} which requires
qx = qy = qz (4.27)
Thus for the six-state protocol the initial values of qx, qy,qz and qI are given
explicitly as
qx = qy = qz =
δ0P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
2(1−∆)Pexp
qI = 1−
3
(
δ0 P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
)
2(1−∆)Pexp . (4.28)
On the contrary such a unique choice is not possible for four-state protocol.
There is one open parameter 0 ≤ qy ≤ 1. However it is known that the map
4.16 gives least value of secret key rate and largest value of phase error rate
for qy = 0 [GL03]. Hence qy = 0 gives the worst possible scenario for map
4.16 for four-state protocol. Thus for four-state protocol initial values can
be chosen as
qy = 0,
qx = qz =
δ0 P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
(1−∆)Pexp ,
qI = 1−
2
(
δ0 P
signal
exp +
1
2
P darkexp
)
(1−∆)Pexp . (4.29)
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With these initial values one can perform the numerical simulations to see
the effect of B steps followed by one-way CSS codes on key generation rates.
It is to be noted that in both four- and six-state protocols, all the error rates
are distance dependent. As the distance increases, the losses increase and
Eve gains more power and knowledge about the key. She is able to take full
advantage of all losses, noise and inefficient detectors.
Experimental parameters
Since the aim of this work is to explore the effect of B-steps on dark counts,
it is of interest to consider two sets of parameters. As described above in
KTH parameters [BG+99] the probability of dark counts is relatively high,
i.e. of the order of 10−4 and detector inefficiency is low, of the order of 0.18.
The theme of the entanglement distillation protocol is to apply one-way
CSS like post processing until it works. Once the cutoff is reached then
B-steps are applied until the error rates are low enough that again one-way
post processing can be applied. For shorter distances one-way post processing
alone is enough. The distance between Alice and Bob is represented by the
length of optical fibre connecting Alice and Bob. At shorter distance the
secret key rate is determined by equations (4.3), (4.5) and (4.6). However as
the distance increases B-steps must be applied and then the corresponding
key generation rate is given by equation (4.23) combined with equations
(4.17-4.22). The initial condition for error rates for B-steps are given by
equation (4.29) for four-state protocol and by equation (4.28) for six-state
protocol. In both the cases the mean photon number is optimized at each
distance to get maximum possible secret-key rate.
The influence of different number of B-steps is depicted in Figure 4.2 for
four-state protocol and in Figure 4.3 for six-state protocol. For n = 0, i.e.
no B-step and one-way post processing alone, the significant rate is achieved
only up to 25 km for both protocols. This distance increases significantly
with one application of B-step. Just one application of B-step increases
this distance to 30 km for four-state protocol and to 34 km in the six-state
protocol. In addition at each application of B-step there is a sudden increase
in key generation rate. This is because the B-step decreases the bit-error
rate significantly and this makes the effect of dark counts less significant.
This effect of dark counts however becomes dominant again as the distance
increases. This results in a new dip in key generation rate. An application
of second B-step then increases the key generation rate again. However for
increasing number of B-steps, this effect becomes less dominant as the phase
error probability of the untagged pairs increases after each B-step and dark
counts become more effective in phase error part. It can also be noticed that
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Figure 4.2: Four-state protocol: The secret key generation rates resulting
from multiple application of B-steps followed by one-way CSS based post
processing. Here n indicates the number of B-steps required prior to one-
way post processing. The solid vertical line indicates the maximum allowed
distance according to inequality 4.7 and the dotted line is the asymptotically
achievable distance by inequality (4.31). The parameters are the same as for
Figure 4.1
4.3Practical QKD with two-way classical communication 76
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance [km]
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
Lo
g 1
0[R
B
CS
S]
Figure 4.3: Six-state protocol: The parameters are the same as for four-state
protocol in Figure 4.2. n denotes the number of B-steps applied
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Figure 4.4: Maximum achievable distance for different numbers of B-steps
for the four-state (lower curve) and the six-state protocol (upper curve).
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in six-state protocol each application of B-step results in larger distance with
lesser decrease in secret-key rate as compared to four-state protocol. This is
because six-state protocol can sustain higher error rates.
The maximum possible distance reached with each B-step is depicted in
Figure 4.4. The maximum distance tends to saturate for around 37km for
four-state protocol and 44km for six-state protocol after six B-steps. This
effect indicates that there is a limit to which B-steps together with one-way
CSS can work. The maximum possible reachable distances are given by
equation (4.7) after which Alice and Bob are no more sharing an entangled
state. However there is another limit on achievable distance up to which
B-step can work. This limit is provided by [RA06]. Since tagged pairs are
already known it is enough to concentrate on purification of untagged pairs
alone. If two-way post processing consists of just B-steps followed by CSS
code then it has been shown [RA06] that the inequality
(
qI − 1
4
)2
+
(
qz − 1
4
)2
>
1
8
, (4.30)
is the necessary condition for the purification of Bell diagonal state of the
form 4.10. Therefore from equations (4.24-4.27), inequality (4.30) yields
∆ <
{
1− 5δ four-state protocol
1
2
(
2− 5δ −√5δ) six-state protocol. (4.31)
These borders are depicted by dotted vertical lines in Figures 4.2 and 4.3
In Figure 4.5 the possible values of tagging probability ∆ and error prob-
ability δ are plotted. Both ∆ and δ are the quantities which Alice and Bob
can measure in the beginning and they can decide whether they should ap-
ply the suggested entanglement purification protocol or not. These plots are
consistent with inequalities (4.7) and (4.31). According to the necessary con-
dition (4.7) secret-key distillation is not possible in the black region. However
there is a small grey region which is not accessible by B-steps followed by
one-way CSS, although in principle allowed by 4.7. Thus having initial values
of ∆ and δ in white region Alice and Bob can confidently start the B-steps
followed by one-way CSS like post processing.
It is clear from Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 that the maximum allowed thresh-
old distances are already reached after a few B-steps. It is therefore enough to
apply a few B-steps without much loss in secret-key rates. These secret-key
rates however fall steeply for higher number of B-steps.
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Figure 4.5: Regions bounded by equations (4.7) (white+grey) and (4.31)
(white) for the four-state (a) and the six-state (b) QKD protocols. Secret
key distillation is not possible by any means in the black region. The grey
region is not accessible to B-steps and CSS-like EPP.
Effect of B-steps on decoy state protocol
It is now of interest to explore the influence of B-steps on decoy state proto-
cols. Decoy state protocols are developed to suppress imperfections arising
from multiphoton pulses. Alice and Bob can get a lower bound on the yield of
single photon pulses by comparing the total yield of decoy pulses before start-
ing the experiment. Decoy state protocol has been explained in Sec. (2.2.1),
we briefly explain it again for the sake of completeness.
The yields of single and multiphoton pulses of both decoy and signal
pulses is the same. Consider a decoy state protocol involving two decoy
weak coherent pulses with mean photon numbers κ and ν and signal pulse
with mean photon number µ. The values of kappa and mu are fixed so that
these pulses fulfill the requirements κ < ν and κexp(−κ) < νexp(−ν) and
µ > κ + ν. Let s1 be the probability that the detector clicks provided a
single photon pulse hits it and sm be the click probability of detector when
multiphoton pulse hits it. Clearly these probabilities or yields are the same
for all decoy and signal pulses. The probabilities P
(κ)
exp and P
(ν)
exp of the decoy
pulses to be detected at the detector obey the relation [Wan05, MQ+05]
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Figure 4.6: Four-state protocol with decoy pulses: The parameters are the
same as in Figure 4.2, while µ = 0.55, κ = 0.10, and ν = 0.27.
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Figure 4.7: Six-state protocol with decoy pulses: The parameters are the
same as in Figure 4.6.
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P (κ)exp = P
dark
exp e
−κ + s1κe−κ + sm(1− e−κ − κe−κ),
P (ν)exp ≥ P darkexp e−ν + s1νe−ν + sm(1− e−κ − κe−κ)
ν2e−ν
κ2e−κ
.
(4.32)
Thereby P darkexp is the probability of dark counts and can be exactly determined
if Alice sends a decoy vacuum pulse in between. Using above relations one
obtains
s1 ≥
ν2eκP
(κ)
exp − κ2eνP (ν)exp − (ν2 − κ2)P darkexp
κν(ν − κ) := s1. (4.33)
Since the signal single photon pulse has the same probability of being de-
tected at the detector, the probability ∆µ of multiphoton signal pulse can be
upper bounded as follows
∆µ ≤ 1− s1µe
−µ
P µexp
:= ∆˜µ (4.34)
In particular, a lower bound on the resulting secret-key generation rate is
obtained from equations (4.16), (4.17), (4.19), (4.21), and (4.23). Thereby,
the recursive relations have to be solved by setting ∆ = ∆˜µ in the initial
conditions (4.28) and (4.29) for the six- and the four-state protocol, respec-
tively. These initial conditions take into account that the phase-error proba-
bility can be bounded from above by δ/(1− ∆˜µ). The resulting lower bound
on the secret-key generation rate and its dependence on the length of the
optical fibre used for the transmission of photons are depicted in figures 4.6
and 4.7 for the four- and the six-state protocol, respectively. Following ref.
[Wan05], µ, κ and ν are chosen to be equal to 0.55, 0.10 and 0.27, respec-
tively. Typically, multiple application of B-steps increase the distance over
which a secret key can be exchanged significantly. The maximum distances
and their dependence on the number of applied B-steps is shown in Fig-
ure 4.8 for both protocols with decoy pulses. The asymptotically achievable
maximum distances of the order of 80 km are reached already after a few
B-steps. Moreover, it is worth noting that the net increase in distance of
about 15 km (after 2 or 3 B-steps) is the same as that for the conventional
four- and six-state protocols.
Experimental parameters with low dark count rate
The main aim of this work had been to see the postponement of dark count
effects. It is therefore of interest to explore the case where dark counts are
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Figure 4.8: Maximum achievable distances for different numbers of B-steps
for the four-state (lower curve) and the six-state (upper curve) protocols with
decoy pulses.
already too low. Following the experimental set up by the ref. [GYS04], the
dark counts are 10−2 times lower than the previous parameters. As stated
earlier such low dark counts occur by lowering the temperature which results
in very low detection efficiency, of the order of ηdet = 0.045. The resulting
key generation rates are shown in Figure 4.9. It is clear that low dark counts
already enhance the distance without any B-steps to a considerable value.
The low detection efficiency does not affect this enhancement much. The
achieved distance by one-way classical communication alone is already too
close to the maximum achievable distance. Thus the percentage increase in
distance is not much compared to one-way post processing.
In conclusion the use of two-way classical communication which mainly
consists of inclusion of CNOT operation (the B-steps) has increased the dis-
tance considerably for both four- and six-state protocols. As mentioned above
the main aim of B-steps is to postpone the effect of dark counts which had
been the main hindrance in protocols based on one-way post processing.
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Figure 4.9: Secret key generation rates for four-state protocol. P darkexp =
2× 10−6 and ηdet = 0.045. The rest of the parameters are same as in Figure
4.2
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
The thesis successfully compiles the major results on robustness bounds on
performance of ideal quantum key distribution protocols and use of two-
way classical communication to enhance the distance up to which secret
key can be distributed for the corresponding protocols with major practical
limitations. For both purposes the entanglement-based versions reducible to
corresponding prepare and measure protocols are used.
For robustness bounds it has been shown that legitimate users share prov-
able entanglement only for disturbance D < 25% and D > 75% for the four-
state and for D < 33% for the six-state protocol. This limitations restricts
the entanglement sharing region in a plot of combination of amplitudes of Bell
diagonal states. For the four-state protocol the disentanglement or separable
state region is bounded by four lines whereas for the six-state protocol it is
reduced to a line due to the additional constraint coming from the presence of
third basis. It is then shown how an adversary Eve can reach these bounds.
In general analysis of eavesdropping attacks, it is the Shannon information
of Eve which is maximized. In our case we analyze how much sacrifice Eve
has to make on her probability of correct guessing and/or information gain.
This analysis is done for incoherent attacks and two-qubit coherent attack
for the four-state protocol. It turns out that for incoherent attack the satu-
ration of the threshold disturbance D = 25% is possible by Eve at the cost
of 4% less information gain by Eve or equivalently at the cost of 7.44% less
correct probability of guessing. For two-qubit coherent attack this threshold
disturbance bound is achievable at the cost of 3% less correct probability of
guessing which is substantially lower than the incoherent attack. Moreover
for maximizing both information gain and probability of correct guessing,
the legitimate users get disentangled at D = 30% for an incoherent attack
and at D = 28% for two-qubit coherent attack. For the six-state protocol
the physically allowed attack is the one which maximizes Eve’s probability
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of correct guessing and simultaneously disentangles the legitimate users for
both incoherent and two-qubit coherent attacks.
In the analysis of practical quantum key distribution the practical limita-
tions considered are presence of multiphoton pulses which exhibit poissonian
behavior. The lossy quantum channel is taken to be optical fibre having
exponential loss. The detectors are the threshold detectors which are the
click or no-click detectors with some probability of producing a click even in
the absence of actual signal. This later clicking is called dark count. In this
scenario two-way classical communication is introduced which involves the
addition of B-steps or CNOTs when one way classical communication fails.
The B-step reduces the error rates to a value where one-way post process-
ing can take over. So the key-generation rates are given by the same GLLP
bound just including the fraction of pairs discarded in each case. Due to the
presence of multiphoton pulses all pairs are not identically treated as in the
preceding works but Eve tags the multiphoton pairs and the single photon
ones remain untagged. During B-step any pair pairing up with tag pairs
becomes totally known to Eve. Inclusion of this important aspect further
increases the number of bits known to Eve. Then the privacy amplification
process needs to be done only on single photon pulses. We have shown that
inclusion of B-steps enhances the distance of secure communication to about
80% for four-state and to 100% for six-state protocol. The important obser-
vation during above analysis was that actually inclusion of a B-step enables
to, some extent, overcome only the dark counts. The key rate suddenly falls
again when the dark counts again become effective. Thus B-steps postpone
the effect of dark counts to some distance. The analysis is done for four- and
six-state and the corresponding decoy-state protocols. Since decoy state pro-
tocols are already designed to overcome the effect of dark counts, the increase
in distance is not as pronounced as for the four- and six-state protocols. It
is worth noting that the effect of dark counts can never be suppressed, they
can only be postponed.
In a recent development [MS07] in the field of practical quantum key
distribution, the same technique of using B-steps is implemented to show
quantum key distribution using passive decoy state selection. Though their
source and detectors are different than proposed by us but the results defi-
nitely show that indeed B-steps are an efficient mean of enhancing distances
up to which secret key can be distributed between legitimate users. They
have used standard parametric down conversion to produce photon sources
which exhibit both poissonian and thermal statistics in extremal cases. The
detection process involves time multiplexed detection (TMD) since it is cost
effective and easy to handle experimentally. The legitimate users need to
discard all slots in the postprocessing stage where the TMD result was zero
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and use the inverted probability distribution in the rate calculations. Since
this type of filtering is applied in the postprocessing phase, it does not modify
the actual signal transmission and no physical blocking is required.
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Appendix A
Numerical Program for
Practical QKD Using Two-way
Classical Communication
The fortran program is given which is used in numerical simulations for
practical QKD.
program: Two-way practical QKD with KTH parameters
implicit none
integer i,imax,B,distmax,Bstep
real dist,ddist,log2,Rate_opt,golden
real ax,bx,cx,tol,etadet,etac,alpha,Lc,P0,mu,Pdark,nu
common/bla/B
common/xs/etac,etadet,alpha,Lc,P0,Pdark
common/stp/Bstep
external RCSS,RBCSS
Character data4
Choosing protocol: B=2 BB84, B=3 Six-state
B=2
Initial Values:
ddist=1d0/100d0
distmax=44
imax=distmax/ddist
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Constant parameters:
etadet=0.18d0
alpha=0.2d0
Lc=1d0
P0=0.01d0
Pdark=2d0*1d-4
Bstep=0
do 30 dist=0d0,distmax,ddist
do 30 i=0,imax,1
dist=i*ddist
etac=10^(-(alpha.dist+Lc)/10d0)
For golden initial values:
ax=0d0.etadet.etac
bx=1d0.etadet.etac
cx= 2d0.etadet.etac
tol=1d-5
if(Bstep.eq.0) then
Rate_opt = golden(ax,bx,cx,RCSS,tol,mu)
else
Rate_opt = golden(ax,bx,cx,RBCSS,tol,nu)
endif
if(Rate_opt.lt.0) then
open(14,file=data4,access=’append’)
write(14,*) dist,log(-Rate_opt)/log(10d0)
close(14)
else
Bstep=Bstep+1
endif
30 continue
stop
end
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NUMERICAL_RECIPIES ROUTINE FOR MINIMIZATION:
FUNCTION golden(ax,bx,cx,f,tol,xmin)
REAL golden,ax,bx,cx,tol,xmin,f,R,C
EXTERNAL f
PARAMETER (R=.61803399,C=1.-R)
REAL f1,f2,x0,x1,x2,x3
x0=ax
x3=cx
if(abs(cx-bx).gt.abs(bx-ax))then
x1=bx
x2=bx+C(cx-bx)
else
x2=bx
x1=bx-C(bx-ax)
endif
f1=f(x1)
f2=f(x2)
1 if(abs(x3-x0).gt.tol(abs(x1)+abs(x2)))then
if(f2.lt.f1)then
x0=x1
x1=x2
x2=R.x1+C.x3
f1=f2
f2=f(x2)
else
x3=x2
x2=x1
x1=R.x2+C.x0
f2=f1
f1=f(x1)
endif
goto 1
endif
if(f1.lt.f2)then
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golden=f1
xmin=x1
else
golden=f2
xmin=x2
endif
return
END
FUNCTION RCSS:
Real Function RCSS(mu)
implicit none
integer B
Real etac,alpha,Lc,etadet
Real mu,Pexp,Delta,Pdark,PexpSignal
Real pz,px,py,p,P0
Real H,x,y
Common/bla/B
Common/xs/etac,etadet,alpha,Lc,P0,Pdark
Basic Formulas:
PexpSignal=1d0-exp(-(mu*etac*etadet))
Pexp=PexpSignal+Pdark-PexpSignal*Pdark
Delta=(1d0-(1d0+mu).exp(-mu))/Pexp
Error probability:
p=(P0.PexpSignal+(Pdark/2d0))/Pexp
If (B.eq.2) then
py=0d0 ! BB84
px=p
pz=p
else
py=p/2d0 ! Six-state
px=p/2d0
pz=p/2d0
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endif
x=px+py
y=((pz+py)-(Pdark/2d0)/Pexp)/(1d0-Delta)
RCSS=-Pexp.(1d0-Delta-H(x)-(1d0-Delta).H(y))/B
return
end
RBCSS:
Real Function RBCSS(mu)
implicit none
integer B,j,Bstep
Real8 etac,alpha,Lc,etadet
Real mu,Pexp,Delta,Pdark,PexpSignal
Real px,py,pz,pi,p,P0,px1,pi1,py1,pz1
Real H, x,y
Real Ps,Qus,Qts
common/xs/etac,etadet,alpha,Lc,P0,Pdark
Common/stp/Bstep
Common/bla
Basic Formulas:
PexpSignal=1d0-exp(-(mu.etac.etadet))
Pexp=PexpSignal+Pdark-PexpSignal.Pdark
Delta=(1d0-(1d0+mu).exp(-mu))/Pexp
Error probability:
p=(P0.PexpSignal+(Pdark/2d0))/Pexp
If (B.eq.2) then
py=0d0 ! BB84
px=p/(1-Delta)
pz=p/(1-Delta)
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pi=1d0-px-py-pz
else
py=p/2d0/(1-Delta) ! Six-state
px=p/2d0/(1-Delta)
pz=p/2d0/(1-Delta)
pi=1d0-px-py-pz
endif
do 33 j=1,Bstep,1
Qus = (pi+pz).(pi+pz)+(px+py).(px+py);
Qts = (pi+pz);
Ps = (1-Delta).(1-Delta).Qus+2.Delta.(1-Delta).Qts+Delta.Delta;
Delta = (Delta*Delta+2*Delta*(1-Delta)*(pi+pz))/Ps;
pz1 = 2.0.pi.pz/Qus;
px1 = (px.px+py.py)/Qus;
py1 = 2.px.py/Qus;
pi1 = 1d0-px1-py1-pz1;
pi = pi1
px = px1;
py = py1;
pz = pz1;
33 continue
x = (1-Delta)*(px+py);
y = pz+py-(Pdark/2d0)/Pexp;
RBCSS=-Pexp.Ps.(1d0-Delta-H(x)-(1d0-Delta).H(y))/(2d0^Bstep)/B
return
end
Entropy:
Real Function H(x)
implicit none
Real x,logbase
H=-x.logbase(x)-(1d0-x).logbase(1d0-x)
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return
end
CHANGE OF LOG TO THE BASE e TO 2:
Real Function logbase(x)
implicit none
Real x
if(x.lt.1d-100) then
logbase=0d0
else
logbase=log(x)/log(2d0)
endif
return
end
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